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4 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
5 JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL,
6 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
7 WASHINGTON, D.C.

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11 INTERVIEW OF: ROBERT GLOVER

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15 Monday, May 2, 2022

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17 Washington, D.C.

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20 The interview in the above matter was held in Room 5480, O'Neill House Office
21 Building, commencing at 9:06 a.m.

1 Appearances:

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4 For the SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE

5 THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE U.S. CAPITOL:

6

7 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

8 [REDACTED], SENIOR INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

9 [REDACTED], STAFF ASSOCIATE

10 [REDACTED], INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

11 [REDACTED], RESEARCHER

12 [REDACTED], CHIEF CLERK

13 [REDACTED], PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

14 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

15 [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL

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1 [REDACTED]. All right. Then we will go on the record at 9:06 this morning.

2 Good morning. Today is May 2, 2022, and we're here for the transcribed
3 interview of Commander Robert Glover of the Metropolitan Police Department. The
4 interview is being conducted by the House Select Committee to Investigate the
5 January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol pursuant to House Resolution 503.

6 My name is [REDACTED]. I'm an investigative counsel for the select committee.

7 And, at this time, I'd ask the witness to please state your full name and spell your
8 last name for the record.

9 Commander Glover. Good morning. My name is Commander Robert Glover,
10 G-I-o-v-e-r. I'm employed by the Metropolitan Police Department.

11 Mr [REDACTED]. Thank you.

12 This will be a staff-led interview, so I'll be asking most of the questions; [REDACTED]
13 and [REDACTED] as well. But, at some point, it's possible that a member might join through
14 the Webex and have a question or two for you, and I'll try to alert you if that happens.
15 And then we'll just kind of deal with that as it comes.

16 Also in the room today we have [REDACTED], senior investigative counsel,
17 and [REDACTED], investigative counsel. There are currently no members in the room.

18 And then I'll note that Commander Glover is not accompanied by counsel today.

19 Just a couple housekeeping matters to discuss before we begin.

20 As I mentioned earlier, there's an official reporter who's going to be transcribing
21 everything that we say. So just make sure you try to wait until I finish my question
22 before you start your answer. Obviously, it's hard for them to record two people talking
23 at the same time.

24 And then, kind of in the same vein, just try to use verbal responses, as opposed to
25 a head shake or something like that. They can only record verbal responses for the

1 record.

2 And then we mentioned acronyms. If we can, let's avoid the use of acronyms,
3 but I understand sometimes those come out. So I'll remind you if something is unclear.

4 Commander Glover. Okay.

5 Mr. [REDACTED]. And then, also, throughout the interview, I'll try to let you know
6 when I'm looking for either kind of like a high-level summary response or something more
7 detailed, so kind of like the trailer versus the feature-length version of an answer. And a
8 lot of times I'll ask you kind of for a general description of something and then we'll go
9 into some more detail after that, just to let you know.

10 Commander Glover. Okay.

11 Mr. [REDACTED]. And then, also, today, just complete answers to the best of your
12 recollection. Obviously, some of these things happened -- or, all of these things
13 happened some time ago. So just let me know if you're not sure about an answer or if
14 you're ballparking a time or a figure or something like that.

15 And then if any of my questions aren't clear, feel free to ask me to rephrase the
16 question or ask for a clarification. I'm always happy to do that.

17 Commander Glover. Okay.

18 Mr. [REDACTED]. And then just a warning that we have to provide all witnesses that
19 we speak to, and that's just that it's unlawful to deliberately provide false information to
20 Congress. So, for this interview, providing false information could result in criminal
21 penalties for false statements.

22 Commander Glover. I understand.

23 Mr. [REDACTED]. I'm sure you're well familiar with that and understand it.

24 And then, as I said, just let me know at any time if you need a break for water or
25 the bathroom or anything like that. We'll try to -- I'm hoping this will take 2 hours or

1 less, and we'll probably take a break at about an hour --

2 Commander Glover. Okay.

3 [REDACTED]. -- but let me know if you need a break at any other time.

4 All right. Great. Then, with those housekeeping matters out of the way, we
5 can get started.

6 EXAMINATION

7 BY [REDACTED]:

8 Q So we'll start kind of simple. If you could just tell me what your current
9 position at MPD is?

10 A I'm a police commander. I'm the soon-to-be-retired commander of the
11 Special Operations Division. For the last 20 days, I've been helping the transition of the
12 division to the new commander.

13 Q Great.

14 And then if you can take me from kind of when you joined the force through some
15 of the positions that you've held up until today?

16 A I was sworn in as a member of the Metropolitan Police Department on
17 November 14th of 1994. I went and experienced recruit training. Graduated the
18 academy in May of 1995.

19 Moved to the First District on my first assignment as a police officer, assigned to
20 patrol. Stayed there from 1995 to, I believe it was 1998, when I got promoted to
21 sergeant up in the Fifth District. Stayed there until early 2000, when I was promoted to
22 lieutenant. Came back to the First District substation as a patrol lieutenant.

23 From there, in 2003 I moved briefly over to the academy for about a month as the
24 recruit training lieutenant. I then joined our, at the time, the Office of Superintendent
25 of Detectives and was assigned to the Third District Detective Unit as the lieutenant

1 there. In 2004, I was moved over to homicide as a lieutenant.

2 And then in 2008, March of 2008, Chief Lanier asked me to join the Special
3 Operations Division as a lieutenant. I maintained that rank through various units within
4 Special Operations Division. Was promoted to captain in April of 2016.

5 And in May of 2020, Chief Newsham promoted me to inspector member of the
6 command staff to head up the inaugural planning office for the department for the
7 inauguration of 2020 -- I'm sorry -- 2021.

8 And then, from there, Chief Contee promoted me to commander shortly after
9 January 6th of 2021.

10 Q Great.

11 Could you just describe a little bit what SOD does and then also what "SOD"
12 stands for, and then maybe focus a little bit on SOD's work as it relates to civil unrest and
13 First Amendment demonstrations?

14 A Sure.

15 "SOD" stands for the Special Operations Division. The Special Operations
16 Division provides support through specialized training to the department.

17 We have the special events section, which handles dignitary movements, such as
18 the President and Vice President, visiting heads of state. They also handle First
19 Amendment activities that are planned and coordinated on a daily basis.

20 Our planning and logistics section handles the written plans and command
21 manuals, works with the organizers of the various First Amendment activities and
22 [inaudible], such as the 5Ks and the marathons, the movie details, things like that.

23 Then we also have our traffic safety and specialized enforcement section that
24 handles fatal and serious-injury crashes, motor carrier/commercial vehicle enforcement,
25 and our traffic safety program, such as Click It or Ticket for seatbelt, impaired driving,

1 DUI/DWI, child safety seat installations, and speed enforcement.

2 Then we have our emergency response team, which is the equivalent of a SWAT
3 team, our special weapons and tactics. They're our tactical element that handles critical
4 incidents such as barricades, high-risk warrants, persons in crisis.

5 Then we have our explosive ordnance disposal section that handles calls for
6 suspicious items or hazardous devices.

7 We have our harbor patrol section that maintains the waterway patrols along the
8 waterfront of the city in conjunction with the Coast Guard.

9 We have our air support section that provides air support to the agency.

10 Then we have our Domestic Security Operations Unit that handles our basic Civil
11 Disturbance Unit training for all members of the department.

12 Our Hazardous Materials Group. They also do critical infrastructure protection.
13 Our special material detection capabilities are run through that office.

14 Then we have our K-9 patrol section that handles patrol K-9s, firearms detection
15 K-9s, and explosive ordnance detection K-9s.

16 And then, let's see, what else am I missing?

17 And we have our administrative unit that handles the paperwork and things like
18 that, the administrative processes.

19 Q Great.

20 So let's move to 2020. And I want to talk a little bit, before we get to
21 January 6th, about, sort of, the summer and the fall leading up to that. I know there
22 was a lot of First Amendment demonstrations that the department was dealing with at
23 that time.

24 So if you could just kind of in general terms describe MPD's experience over the
25 summer of 2020 and the fall of 2020, leading into the election timeframe, kind of as it

1 relates to those First Amendment demonstrations?

2 A As we recognized the tragic murder of Mr. Floyd in May of 2020, the unrest
3 started in the Midwest. And the unrest kind of was focused there for a few days, and
4 then our first night was that Friday up at the White House in Lafayette Park. A group of
5 about 300, 400 individuals assembled, initially peacefully, inside of Lafayette Park.

6 From that first night, we experienced the next night of rioting in the city. It was
7 beyond First Amendment. It started very peacefully that evening, that second night,
8 and had transitioned into riotous conditions later that night.

9 And then we had the third night of continued -- again, it started peacefully and
10 then evolved in the evening time and hours of darkness into riotous conditions.

11 And then we had the fourth night, which was the movement of the President to
12 St. John's Church, which caused, again, cascading riotous behavior from that activity. A
13 lot of use of force by several agencies in clearing Lafayette Park. We were not part of
14 that. We dealt with the end result of the crowd that was moved onto the city
15 jurisdiction. We did have some members hurt that night as a result of that activity.

16 And then we maintained our presence around what is now known as Black Lives
17 Matter Plaza through the rest of that summer in peaks and waves of First Amendment
18 activity that was peaceful, with marching and things like that, that would later transition,
19 most nights, into some type of property destruction or some type of criminal behavior by
20 what is commonly referred to as the group of antifa.

21 Then we went into our own unfortunate incident up in our Fourth District
22 involving the death of an individual during police contact that resulted in unrest up in our
23 Fourth District for a couple nights.

24 They did substantial property damage to the 4D station the first night. And we
25 had about a week period up there where we maintained presence there. Again, some

1 marchings and assemblies. We did have one night of rioting and substantial property
2 damage up along Georgia Avenue, a couple of our businesses there -- the Walmart, the
3 Walgreens pharmacy, the AutoZone, and some other storefronts there.

4 At the same time, we were in preparation for the first activity in November for
5 Women -- Women for America, I believe it was, was the organizer, based out of Freedom
6 Plaza. That drew a lot of extreme conservatism groups into the city, to include the
7 Proud Boys.

8 Antifa was well aware of that. And when I say "antifa," I'm using that as an
9 umbrella for the left extreme, to counter that right extreme.

10 We had three nights in November where those two groups were looking for each
11 other through the night and hours of darkness where we had to keep full department
12 activation. All of our Civil Disturbance Unit platoons were activated. We spent long
13 nights keeping them separated as best as we could.

14 That first period in November, we recovered a number of firearms during that first
15 round. Lots of use of force, unfortunately, to keep the parties separated, and assaults
16 on law enforcement personnel from several agencies.

17 We'd also had a period of time where, in between those nights, from May up until
18 November, we had attempts over at the Lincoln Park over there; we had some periods of
19 unrest over at Lincoln Park. And then we had the statue there next to our police
20 headquarters that was torn down as well.

21 Then we moved into December. We had another Women First for
22 America -- whatever brand they were using at that moment in time -- again stationed out
23 of Freedom Plaza, again over a 3-day period, where it was another full department
24 activation, involved all of our Civil Disturbance Units activated.

25 And, again, antifa was well aware of that, so, again, we spent many long nights

1 keeping those groups separated. The Proud Boys were again the center of focus of that.

2 And the period of December -- what was unique about November and December:
3 In November, then-POTUS Trump took his motorcade around Freedom Plaza through the
4 crowds, which was very unusual. It presented some challenges. And in December,
5 they flew the Presidential helicopter, HMX-1, over the Supreme Court. Again,
6 something that -- ultimately those groups marched over to the Supreme Court both
7 times, in November and December.

8 We did supplement the Supreme Court and Capitol Police with resources in both
9 of those marches and assemblies over at the Court. And for the most part it was
10 peaceful, but there were some contentious moments at both of those rallies in front of
11 the Supreme Court.

12 We did have to help Capitol Police the first go around clear the one area over by
13 the Reserve Building and then tighten up some of the lines with extra personnel to make
14 sure there was no breaches going on in the Court.

15 In that same period of time, we also had to refocus the Republican National
16 Convention as well. Everything had been planned for Florida, but it ad-hoc-ly moved
17 into the city. So we had challenges through that period of time as well.

18 All, meanwhile, we were spending the January 5th and 6th preparations in the
19 National Park Service planning cycle. So we were monitoring that closely. We
20 activated the entire department, restricted leave to 5 percent only.

21 Q I'll stop you there, and then we'll get into the January 5th and 6th events
22 soon. I had a couple followup questions to some of the things that you mentioned.

23 First, you mentioned you were using the term "antifa" just to kind of generally
24 describe the far left.

25 Can you go into a little bit more detail about, in your mind and to your

1 understanding, what antifa is, and then also, at events, kind of how you would identify
2 antifa or what you see as the typical antifa appearance or presence or anything like that?

3 A Certainly.

4 Antifa is known as antifascism, antigovernment, from the left's perspective, the
5 extreme left's perspective. They're generally associated with all black clothing. They
6 like to use the anarchist symbol of the "A" in red. Also "ACAB" is another acronym that
7 they used. They're identified oftentimes by the black clothing.

8 They have also routinely and within the ranks, they have medical support, or
9 "street medics" is what they like to call them.

10 They garner a broad spectrum of affinity groups underneath that umbrella to the
11 left, such as environmental, social causes.

12 But they're generally associated with all black clothing. They try to hide their
13 identities by wearing masking, goggles, and other accoutrements that disguise their
14 identities so that law enforcement can't easily identify them later.

15 Q Okay.

16 And then we'll also be talking about another group that you've mentioned, the
17 Proud Boys. And I'm just curious, when was the first time you learned of or
18 encountered the Proud Boys?

19 A So we've had Proud Boys in the city prior to October -- I'm sorry -- actually,
20 November, December. We had them during Unite the Right 1 and 2, the tragedy in
21 Charlottesville. They've been in the city several times. They did not draw as big of
22 counter groups as what they had this time in November and December, but we did have
23 some counter groups show up from antifa's side or the extreme left those previous
24 occasions.

25 We've also dealt with the Patriot Front as well. They're more of a White

1 supremacy nationalist group on the extreme right. And we dealt with the Patriot Front
2 several times, as well, coming into the city. They're the ones that like to assemble out in
3 Virginia, march in in their fascist marching columns. They carry their red, white, and
4 blue shields and their design of what they consider their American flag and alterations
5 that are symbolic to their group.

6 So we've dealt with the Patriot Front as well. But Proud Boys have been in a
7 couple times over the years, last couple years.

8 Mr. [REDACTED]. Okay.

9 Let's go into recess for just a minute.

10 [Discussion off the record.]

11 Mr. [REDACTED]. We can go back on the record at 9:26.

12 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

13 Q So we talked about antifa and the Proud Boys. We'll talk about some of the
14 rally organizers, too, for the November and December and January events.

15 And just to kind of establish terms, I think you've mentioned Women for America;
16 we've known them as Women for America First, or WFAF.

17 And so I wanted to ask -- to kind of go into the November and December events
18 and talk about your experience with those a little bit.

19 So let's focus on November 14th. Some people call it MAGA 1. We can just call
20 it the November 14th rally. Can you tell me what you expected, going into that event,
21 as far as crowd size goes, or what you had been told?

22 A Sure.

23 Our primary organizer that we dealt with in November was a lady by the name of
24 Cindy Chafian. She was the permit holder for both National Park Service and for the
25 Metropolitan Police Department. Although we did not issue any permits because of the

1 pandemic restrictions at the time, she proceeded with her National Park Service permits.

2 We were engaged -- National Park Service has a very robust planning cycle, just
3 like we do. We were engaged on those planning phone calls. We were doing
4 everything through Teams and Webex with the organizers because of the pandemic.

5 But she was very, in my opinion, misleading with her information. It was like she
6 was hiding who was really behind the event itself.

7 With numbers, it was very hard to draw out what she was expecting, crowd size.
8 We obviously knew what she was requesting on the permit. Indications were, going to
9 be much larger.

10 She was very reluctant to provide a speakers list, performing list, and things like
11 that that, normally, most organizers will provide as a requirement through the permitting
12 process with National Park Service, and it's something that we ask organizers to provide
13 as well. It gives us a litmus test so we can properly prepare and organize our plan. It
14 determines our staffing levels and things like that.

15 But the temperature across the Nation coming out of the period of unrest through
16 that summer, we knew that we had to be fully prepared, so we did a full department
17 activation. We also elicited the assistance of several agencies within the region to
18 preposition their assets, as well, to make sure we had sufficient personnel to handle any
19 contingencies.

20 Q I want to ask a little bit about that term, "full activation" or "full department
21 activation." Is that the same sort of activation that was done for January 6th?

22 A Yes, sir.

23 Q Okay. And what does that entail, when there's full activation?

24 A Certainly. That requires all uniformed members of the department to be
25 working. And, again, leave is restricted to 5 percent of a command. And that's a

1 collective bargaining with our labor, a concession that we make to make sure that -- you
2 know, people do have important family events and medical procedures, whatever that is.

3 But all of Special Operations Division was working. All of our 28 Civil Disturbance
4 Unit platoons were activated, staffed. And then we moved our investigative
5 plain-clothes assets into uniform to take our traffic posts, to free up our CDU, our Civil
6 Disturbance Unit, members to be able to be out there.

7 So, all total, when you talk about Civil Disturbance Units, we're just over 1,000
8 people with all the officials and officers assigned. The Special Operations Division is
9 another 185, roughly, people at that time. And then our traffic ranged from
10 anywhere -- because we did two shifts. We were looking at about another 200 people
11 involved in both of those shifts, so another 400 that we used for traffic.

12 And then maintaining our ability to run 911 back in our districts.

13 Q Great job with the acronyms there.

14 A Okay.

15 Q So I also want to ask a little bit about the permitting process. I know you
16 work with Park Police on that. And I think you said that MPD didn't issue permits
17 because of the COVID restrictions.

18 Can you just generally describe for me, what is Park Police's permitting
19 jurisdiction, and where does MPD control permits?

20 A Yes, sir.

21 So, using Freedom Plaza, Freedom Plaza itself falls within National Park Service
22 land, so they would have the permitting rights to that Freedom Plaza. As you step off
23 the curb onto Pennsylvania Avenue, that becomes the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
24 Police Department for permitting.

25 They originally requested a march permit from Freedom Plaza to the Supreme

1 Court. Of course, her numbers were over the -- I believe, at the time, I think we were
2 restricted to 25 in November, and I think we may have been up to 50 people in
3 December. I forget. All the pandemic guidance had changed several times. But we
4 did not issue a permit because of the baseline number she put on her request.

5 Q And what does that mean when -- because, obviously, a march occurred,
6 right?

7 A Uh-huh.

8 Q And so, when MPD doesn't issue a permit, what's the, kind of, upshot of
9 that?

10 A We still had to be prepared. We knew that, even though we had not issued
11 a permit, that they were going to march from Freedom Plaza to the Court. So we had
12 already planned accordingly. We had already made sure that we had all of our traffic
13 posts, our heavy blocking vehicles -- support from our Department of Transportation,
14 Department of Public Works with the blocking vehicles. We refer to them as "impact
15 suppression vehicles." That's something we've been doing for a while.

16 So we already prepared the march route to secure that, because we knew that
17 they were still going to march.

18 Q Does the fact that MPD didn't issue a permit change anything, or is the
19 response different at all?

20 A No. The premise of the department and the city as a whole is facilitation of
21 peaceful First Amendment activities, whether that's a marching or just standing together.
22 We are allowed to place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. But in doing
23 that, you have to weigh those reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions -- do you
24 want to use force? Do you want to use coercion? You know, how do you really
25 enforce those?

1 We felt, at the time, it was better to allow it to proceed, but fully prepare to allow
2 it to proceed.

3 Q And then let's talk a little bit about, sort of, the clashes between protesters
4 and counterprotesters at that event. And I want to focus a little bit on the difference
5 between daytime and nighttime.

6 So, first, can we start with daytime? How would you describe the level of unrest
7 during the day at the November 14th rally?

8 A We had several incidents during the daytime where small groups of
9 antifa-type individuals from the left would try to seek out groups of the right walking
10 down from the hotels. It was more of a hotspot-type incident. But as the -- that was
11 during the daytime. And at nighttime it increased significantly, the amount of
12 confrontations.

13 November was really bad at night, centered around Harry's Bar and the
14 Hotel Harrington there at 11th and E Street Northwest. The Proud Boys were using that
15 hotel as their base of operations.

16 We had a stabbing that night -- that -- I'm sorry, that second night, if I remember
17 correctly, there on 11th Street. We had a lot of resources. We had to basically secure
18 several blocks around the hotel to keep antifa from coming down and doing a direct
19 confrontation.

20 The stabbing occurred when one member of antifa was able to walk down the
21 sidewalk, posing as a normal citizen, and got in there and got in a confrontation with
22 some of the Proud Boy members. One of our sergeants ended up actually protecting
23 him and getting him out. It was a -- we were able to make an arrest in that case.

24 But in nighttime it really did increase at the hotels that the extreme right was
25 staying at. They'd go back to the hotels and were drinking heavily. They would come

1 out in front. They would challenge law enforcement. Antifa was looking for them.

2 Some of the groups -- Proud Boys marched one time at night, where we had to put
3 resources to keep them separated and monitor them. It was a very resource-taxing
4 endeavor, to keep the parties separated.

5 Q And this is -- just to make sure we're talking about the right event. So
6 there's the stabbing in November, but then, also, there's a separate stabbing that occurs
7 in the December event?

8 A It all kind of blurs together, unfortunately.

9 Q Sure. And maybe I can help you make sure we're identifying the right date.
10 The December event is the one where the flag burning occurs, and there's a member of
11 antifa that gets into a large group of Proud Boys near Hotel Harrington.

12 A Yes.

13 Q And there's -- okay. So --

14 A Yes.

15 Q -- what you were just talking about was the December --

16 A December. Yes, sir.

17 Q Okay. Got it.

18 A Yes.

19 Q So, then, taking, again, November 14th, still accurate to say, though, that
20 during the day the level of unrest -- or that level of unrest escalated at night and there
21 was, kind of, more violent interactions between protesters and counterprotesters at
22 night?

23 A Yes. That is very accurate.

24 Q Okay.

25 And then let's talk about December 12th -- or, actually, sorry, on November 14th,

1 do you, just ballpark figure, have an idea of the crowd size for November 14th?

2 A Very large.

3 Q How about this? How would you compare the crowd size in November to
4 the crowd size in December?

5 A It's tough to make that comparison, because we had the motorcade try to
6 get through in November and the helicopter went over in December.

7 Looking at it in front of the court, once they ultimately ended up in front of the
8 Supreme Court, November, 1st Street from Constitution down to the front of the Court
9 was packed solid. In December, the crowd moved a little better. It wasn't as dense as
10 it was in November.

11 So I would say November was actually probably more, looking at crowd density,
12 versus December.

13 Q And that's consistent with what we've heard as well.

14 Okay. So let's talk about December 12th and a little bit about that permitting
15 process also. Was it a similar story with the permits that were issued and the march
16 permit situation?

17 A Yes, same posture for us on our permitting. We did not issue a permit
18 because of the pandemic restrictions. But, again, we were fully prepared that they were
19 still going to march.

20 Again, the same type of planning cycle. I will give credit to Ms. Chafian. At that
21 point in time, she seemed to be a little bit more familiar with the planning cycle, with the
22 National Park Service permits process.

23 But still very hesitant to provide a lot of concrete information that was required.
24 Again, without providing speaker lists, performing lists, and things like that. It was very
25 difficult to get that information. I don't think we ever did get a final speakers list to

1 either date.

2 Q Did you get a sense or do you have an opinion about why she was
3 withholding that information or less than forthcoming?

4 A I would describe it as her being almost a puppet on a string. It seemed like
5 there was a lot of people behind the scenes that she was the front person for and that
6 she was being used to be the public front of this.

7 I think she was willing. I think she knew full well what was going on. But I think
8 she was hiding a lot of the information of who was really funding things and who was
9 really organizing things.

10 Q And then for the total crowd size, we've kind of established that it seems like
11 November was a larger crowd than December. Can you compare for me the presence of
12 Proud Boys and antifa at those two events?

13 A I would say the Proud Boy numbers pretty much stayed consistent. They
14 normally -- when they bring in the national call for the Proud Boys, they can get anywhere
15 from 200 to 300 people on their side.

16 The antifa range can be 50 to maybe 300. And on that antifa side, it really is kind
17 of geared to what else is going on throughout the country. They seem to have, what I
18 call them, professional protesters on that side. Remember, we had the period of unrest
19 still ongoing out in Portland and Seattle. So, numbers-wise, I would say there was
20 probably a little less antifa in December than there was in November.

21 Q Okay.

22 And then, also, daytime versus nighttime, for December, was it a similar story
23 relatively? Unrest increased as the evening came?

24 A Yes, that is correct.

25 Q All right.

1 A Again, the focus seemed to be, the extreme right would go back to the
2 hotels, consume intoxicating beverages, come back outside. Again, that was when, I
3 believe it was Enrique Tarrio did burn the flag at the one historic Black church.

4 We actually had coverage at some of the churches that time in December. We
5 had gotten some information that they were potentially looking at the historic Black
6 churches and the significance on that, counter to the BLM movement. So we did have
7 assets at some of those churches.

8 But even with those assets in front of the churches, you're putting eyes there, not
9 a full contingent, just to keep us updated.

10 As the Proud Boys moved about, both in November and December, we would
11 maneuver our Civil Disturbance Units around with them to flank them and to stay out a
12 block in each direction to kind of intercept those counters. The premise is to try to do
13 crowd separation.

14 Q And then for Proud Boys and antifa, can you describe, sort of, how they
15 interact or what their posture is as it relates to the MPD? You know, is one more
16 deferential than the other? Kind of, get into a description of how you saw them
17 commonly or typically interact with the police.

18 A Certainly.

19 Proud Boys try to engage law enforcement in a positive manner. They always
20 want to make it look like they're law enforcement's friends. Whereas the antifa side just
21 basically -- "FTP," I know that that's gonna come out, when I explain what FTP is, but it
22 stands for "fuck the police." They don't like the police. They don't like uniformed law
23 enforcement.

24 So it was almost, the Proud Boys wanted to endear themselves or make it look like
25 they were endeared to law enforcement, whereas antifa just didn't want anything to do

1 with law enforcement. And we kind of knew that going into it.

2 And it's the politics of how both sides operate. Again, the right, law and order.
3 Again, the left is going to be that antigovernment side.

4 Q Okay. And we'll kind of revisit that a little bit when we get into January 6th
5 and I ask you to kind of describe how the crowd was interacting with the police on that
6 day. But that's useful.

7 Okay. So, then, let's fast-forward to, kind of, the period of time immediately
8 before January 6th and some of the planning and permitting operations that happened
9 there.

10 Can you, just kind of high level, generally describe for me how the permitting
11 process worked for the 5th and the 6th?

12 A Certainly.

13 Both of those events did not include any marching to the Supreme Court. There
14 was no request for that, as I recall.

15 January 5th was -- again, Cindy Chafian was the initial requester for the permit at
16 both Freedom Plaza on the 5th and also the Ellipse on the 6th. However, due to internal
17 organizer issues, it went back and forth about the event on the 5th, whether that was
18 going to occur or not occur. Ultimately, it did still move forward, but Cindy Chafian was
19 excluded from that group.

20 And so the permit for the Ellipse on January 6th continued underneath a different
21 individual. I don't recall ultimately who ultimately ended up on the National Park
22 Service permit as the main organizer for January 6th.

23 Q So you mention that, again, there wasn't a permit for the march, but was it
24 different for the 6th? Did MPD know to expect a march on the 6th?

25 A We did not.

1 We, again, believed that there was more to the 6th than what was being let on.
2 We did not feel comfortable that they were being entirely forthright with what was going
3 to happen on the 6th.

4 Again, we established the exclusionary zone. Any time we believe there's going
5 to be a large gathering, we look at how we box out the traffic, through the traffic posts,
6 the impact suppression vehicles with the large trucks. And it allows us, as first
7 responders, both on the fire and EMS side and law enforcement side, to respond better
8 to anything that would happen. It also protects them, you know, from any vehicles
9 getting in and -- whether accidental or intentional.

10 So we had already come up with a plan for January 6th to box out that area, all the
11 way over to 9th Street Northwest and all the way over to 23rd Street on the west, in
12 partnership with Park Police, Uniformed Division Secret Service.

13 Q Okay.

14 And then this is where some of the aspects of this -- our filming project here
15 comes into play. I'm going to ask you just to give me, sort of, that answer again, but my
16 question got in the way a little bit. I'd like to hear you say, so that we get it on film, that
17 MPD didn't know that there was going to be a march or hadn't planned for that.

18 So let's pretend I ask you that question again, and then let's hear that answer one
19 more time.

20 A Certainly.

21 We knew that there was going to be an assembly on the Ellipse. We were not
22 expecting a march. So to protect that assembly, we were prepared to go over to
23 Ninth Street on the east side and 23rd Street to the west side. Into the north, I believe
24 we used H Street or I Street. Into the south, I believe we identified Independence
25 Avenue as just kind of the south border.

1 And, again, we designed that plan around that to keep vehicles out and to allow
2 first responders ease of movement. But we were not prepared or -- well, we were
3 prepared; we weren't expecting any marching or any movement over to the Capitol or
4 the Supreme Court on January 6th.

5 Q And so can you tell me what, if anything, might've been done differently if
6 you had been told that there was going to be a march from the Ellipse to the Capitol or
7 the Supreme Court area?

8 A I think the only thing differently that we could've done at that point -- again,
9 we had all of our resources activated -- we may have looked at a little bit different staging
10 locations for our resources. We would've probably distributed some further to the east.
11 We probably would've just made some of those minor adjustments.

12 Again, we had all 28 platoons activated. And we had enlisted the National Guard
13 to take a large bulk of the traffic posts, as well, to free up even more of our members in
14 uniform.

15 Ms. [REDACTED]: Can I ask a question?

16 Mr. [REDACTED]: Uh-huh.

17 BY MS. [REDACTED]:

18 Q I just want to go back to the planning process you described in November
19 and December, that there were robust calls with Park Police. Was that similar for
20 January 6th?

21 A Not as robust. There were efforts for the National Park Service and Park
22 Police to get information, but there seemed to be a lot of information being withheld.

23 Q Why do you say that?

24 A We wanted to know -- in our opinion, in our experience, we believed that
25 there was something else that they weren't telling us.

1 So, during that process, I was able to look through some of the permits and the
2 paperwork that goes into the National Park Service. And as I'm paging through that, I
3 see part of the equipment list is "POTUS lighting package." So that was our first
4 indication that this was a lot more than just a January 6th organizer, that POTUS was
5 most likely going to be there.

6 We reached out in earnest to the Secret Service through all of our channels,
7 especially WFO, the Washington Field Office, to see if they had any indications that
8 POTUS was going to attend or the Vice President was going to attend, and they had no
9 information. It wasn't showing on what they call their "look ahead," where they keep all
10 the partners informed about the known movements.

11 But it was very indicative of finding that paperwork that clearly said "POTUS
12 lighting package" in part of the equipment list, which we felt, at that point in time, it was
13 kind of the giveaway that we were facing probably POTUS coming to this event.

14 Q Do you remember when you reached out and when you realized that it was
15 possible that the President would be coming to the event?

16 A I can't give you an exact date, but I believe it was very late in December
17 when they finally did submit some of the required paperwork into the National Park
18 Service and National Park Service shared that package with us. It was very late
19 December.

20 Q And was it always -- was there any other Federal agency that was part of the
21 planning for January 6th that you interacted with?

22 A So, on these planning calls, they're tooled in general to what jurisdictions
23 they're going to touch. But the invitation goes out to all the main planning from both
24 the Secret Service Uniformed Division, Secret Service agent side. United States Capitol
25 Police Special Events are normally on the calls; Metropolitan Police Department. Metro

1 Transit has somebody on the call normally, both from the operations of the rail and bus
2 side and to the uniformed law enforcement side. FEMS, our Fire and Emergency
3 Medical Services for the District, are normally included on those calls as well.

4 Q But apart from National Park Service, what, if any, other Federal agency was
5 on those planning calls?

6 A I believe Secret Service and I believe United States Capitol Police may have
7 had representatives on those calls.

8 Q Do you remember anyone from the FBI or ATF?

9 A I don't believe ATF. And I'm not sure if one of these special events persons
10 from the Bureau got on or not.

11 Q And who were running those calls for January 6th?

12 A National Park Service permitting. So it's underneath Robbin Owen; it's her
13 office. And I don't remember if it was Marisa. It might've been a combination of
14 Marisa and Leonard Lee and -- I can't think of the other individual that may have come
15 on.

16 Q That's okay.

17 Just to go back to one thing -- before you start into January 6th, [REDACTED] - you
18 mentioned that you felt Cindy Chafian was misleading. What made you believe that?

19 A She -- it comes from my experience. Part of what I was able to do through
20 my career is, you can read people, even though you're not interacting with them, just by
21 their tone of voice. When you ask them a very direct question -- "How many people are
22 you expecting?" "Well, I don't know. You know, it's not going to be more than 5,000.
23 It's not going to be" -- this. "Well, what about your speakers?" "Well, we don't know
24 yet."

25 And you know when somebody is spending that amount of money, they already

1 have a good idea of what's going to happen. They wouldn't be throwing that amount of
2 money at this without having that plan already in place, their envisionment of what this is
3 going to be.

4 And some of that comes from comparison of how she was acting versus a routine
5 organizer that's very forthcoming, walks in, and goes, "Okay, here's my program. The
6 music's going to start at 7:00 a.m. The first speaker's going to be at 8:15. You know,
7 opening with a prayer. We're going to have this, we're going to have this performer."

8 None of that was occurring through either one of these planning cycles. It was
9 very secretive. And I could get the sense, just from how she was acting, I think she knew
10 more than what she was telling us at that point in time.

11 I also think, in comparison to how she acted November and December and then
12 going into January, I don't think her organization trusted her at that point either. And I
13 think, for whatever reason, they disconnected internally to her organization and she was
14 moved out. And then January 5th was a question about whether she was going to move
15 forward with her program underneath her permit, but January 6th was moving in a
16 completely different direction with a new organizer, and she was severed from that
17 January 6th piece.

18 Q Right. And I think [REDACTED] will get into that a little bit.

19 One final question on this. You mentioned that the National Guard you were
20 coordinating with for January 6th on the traffic points. Did you have a contact person
21 that you dealt with on your level?

22 A We normally dealt with Colonel --

23 Q Hunter?

24 A No. [REDACTED] he's been moved into a different position now. I'd have
25 to go back in my phone and look.

1 Q That's okay.

2 A But we dealt with one colonel on the main planning side. And then
3 normally on the game day it's for the operations side; it was, like, Colonel Dean, now
4 General Dean, and that line. So the planning piece gets taken care of by the logistics
5 side. And then on the operations day, we get a whole command team that comes in.
6 And that can vary.

7 Q And on the day of, who was the person? You said Colonel -- General Dean?

8 A Yeah, now General Dean.

9 Q Right.

10 A But he's now their adjutant over there.

11 Q And did you see him at MPD headquarters?

12 A So I -- I didn't get to MPD headquarters on January 6th until very late that
13 night.

14 Q Okay.

15 A Normally I stay in the field. Very rarely will I bounce into a command post.

16 Q Got it. Okay. Gotcha.

17 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

18 Q So, for the permitting process, I know the permit holder normally has to
19 propose some sort of security plan, right, or at least give you details about what they are
20 arranging as far as security goes?

21 Can you tell me about Women for America First and Cindy Chafian's security plan
22 for the 5th and the 6th?

23 A So her husband -- I can't remember his name --

24 Q That's fine.

25 A -- is tied to a veterans group that provides dignitary protection and security.

1 Encountered him when they had an event over at John Marshall Park on that one Sunday.
2 I believe that was back in November. But they were relying on that group, November
3 and December.

4 January 5th and 6th, seemed to be that was the way they were going to go. And
5 then when the disorganization happened and she got severed off the 6th, it got
6 undertaken by another company that's done events at Trump Hotel before through the
7 RNC, but they're tied to the Trump family.

8 I met that gentleman during some of the inaugural and RNC planning sessions up
9 at Secret Service's dignitary protection section that handles special events for the Service.

10 The big question we always have is: Is your security going to be armed? Which
11 you can't have in the District of Columbia or on National Park Service property.

12 Then it evolved into more of this -- each speaker had their own envisionment of
13 what they wanted for security. The guy who drove around here with the armored unit
14 for a while -- I can't think of his name -- he had his own contingency of veterans, Oath
15 Keepers, Three Percenters. There's a lot of veterans that got sucked into the security
16 plan.

17 But it was all underneath the umbrella of that one company that was associated
18 with the Trump family.

19 Q And then, just so that we can put some names to these organizations, so the
20 one that Mr. Chafian -- I think his first name is Scott Chafian -- was involved with, is that
21 First Amendment Praetorians?

22 A I believe it is. Yes, sir.

23 Q Okay. And then do you recall the name of that company that was also
24 engaged in the security planning?

25 A I don't recall. I just know that they showed up in meetings in black pants

1 and black polo shirts.

2 Q If I gave you a name, would it ring a bell? Is it RMS Security?

3 A I believe that is it. Yes, sir.

4 Q Okay.

5 And then, so you mentioned that some veterans groups got pulled into the
6 planning. I think you mentioned the Oath Keepers and Three Percenters. How did you
7 know that they became involved in the planning?

8 A We were monitoring open-source information. Proud Boys was, I believe,
9 going to be doing security for somebody as well, too. But a lot of social media traffic
10 that we were monitoring that was open-source.

11 Some of the stuff was behind the scenes in some of the encrypted chat rooms and
12 things like that, that we had no idea what was going on behind the scenes.

13 But there was -- especially when we saw Cindy Chafian getting knocked off the
14 January 6th permit and the question about whether the 5th was going to go or not, things
15 became very encapsulated on the Ellipse and very tough. And even from our reading of
16 the room with Secret Service, they didn't really know what was to be expected either.
17 There was a lot of questions that they had that they just didn't have answers to that they
18 normally would've been able to say, "Hey, we're working with this person."

19 Again, it seemed also like, no matter what was going to be said, January 6th was
20 going to happen whether permits was issued or not. It seemed like that was a
21 full-speed-ahead event.

22 Q Can you talk about whether or not you think that's a good idea or a bad idea,
23 that these veterans groups would become involved in the security plan for these events?

24 A I think it's a bad idea. We have regulations for a reason, both at the city
25 level and National Park Service level. You want a professional organization. You want

1 a legitimate organization. You want to make sure they have insurance. You want to
2 make sure they have training, that they meet the minimum requirements. And if you
3 don't have that, it opens up Pandora's box. You know, are they going to try to assault
4 somebody trying to do dignitary protection? All those questions come into mind.

5 You know, also, for the District of Columbia and the National Park Service, having
6 firearms is a huge deal. You just can't do it, especially First Amendment activities. It's
7 prohibited. So the only ones that can legally carry a firearm are going to be on-duty law
8 enforcement at that point.

9 So, again, those are the types of questions that we try to draw out from any
10 organizer. But it was very difficult as we moved through the planning processes through
11 all of this. You know, we didn't want these groups coming in thinking they could run
12 willy-nilly and just do their own style of protection or whatever they envisioned as
13 security.

14 Q Something that you obviously see a lot on January 6th is -- and particularly
15 associated with some of these militia groups and Oath Keepers and those sorts of
16 folks -- are that they come in what they believe is or their version of, kind of, combat
17 gear, "full battle rattle," as they would describe it.

18 Can you just tell me about what the effect of that sort of presence is on a crowd,
19 or if it has any effect at all?

20 A It goes to mindset. It's crowd psychology; it's crowd dynamics. If you
21 have people walking around in full combat kit, it makes it look like they're looking for a
22 fight or they're expecting a fight. It leads us to believe that they're looking for a
23 confrontation or that they're preparing for a confrontation.

24 The premise of a peaceful organization or assembly is people just show up in their
25 street clothes or their uniform or their -- whatever signifies to their event wouldn't be

1 needed for that, that you could rely on your local law enforcement, whether it be Secret
2 Service, us, Park Police, Capitol Police. You wouldn't need that.

3 Q Okay.

4 A So it raised a lot of alarm bells when we started seeing that.

5 Q Okay.

6 And then let's talk about, sort of, leading into the 6th. I know for November and
7 December, you said MPD was fully activated. I take it, that was the same for
8 January 6th?

9 A It was. We were fully activated.

10 And, again, we also enlisted the support from our local regional partners.
11 Chief Contee had reached out to Arlington County, Montgomery County, Prince George's
12 County, to have contingents of their Civil Disturbance Units ready to go.

13 On January 6th, we had those agencies -- we initially gave them a reporting time
14 later in the day, but as things started to grow early that morning, we actually made the
15 decision to say, can you come in early, and we actually moved them into the city much
16 earlier that day.

17 Same thing back in November and December -- yeah, November and December.
18 We also had them pre-staged within the city as well.

19 Q Other than being on full activation, can you describe, sort of -- and you can
20 take this up at kind of a high level, but -- the other operational changes that happened for
21 the 6th, given what you understood the event to be?

22 A Certainly.

23 Again, we took our investigative units and ripped them down to bare bones, to
24 leave them enough detectives and investigative personnel to handle the District 911 calls
25 for service across our city. We put them all in uniform.

1 We activated our mass processing center over our police academy, should we
2 need to make arrests. So we put in the transportation detail as well. So we activated
3 what was then called the Narcotics and Special Investigations Division, now the Violent
4 Crime Suppression Division -- they were fully activated, which was another 200-and-some
5 people.

6 We take our recruits and use them for prisoner control. So we activate our
7 recruits. Even though they're not out of the academy, we even deploy them.

8 We used our cadets, our cadet corps, to take over some administrative functions
9 in some of the stations, to help support those station operations that had to continue to
10 free up all of our sworn bodies that we possibly could, to put them out on the street
11 during this detail.

12 Q And then can you talk a little bit about what you -- so I know you said
13 Ms. Chafian wasn't really forthcoming about crowd size. What did you expect the crowd
14 size to be on January 6th?

1 [10:05 a.m.]

2 Commander Glover. Again, from past knowledge and experience and looking at
3 the footprint of the Ellipse, a good example is the Christmas tree lighting. We know that
4 you can put about 5,000 to 7,500 people in there, depending on how many seats you
5 have reserved and things like that. So you have to look in geographical footprints. We
6 know Freedom Plaza as a whole without anything on it can hold about 10,000 people
7 standing, but once you start putting the stage and things like that, it narrows that down
8 to about 5,000 before you start experiencing the spillover on to the streets.

9 So the Ellipse we were expecting maybe 5,000 is what we were expecting to
10 physically go into the Ellipse area that had a been designated.

11 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

12 Q All right. And then I think that sort of takes us to the morning of the 6th.
13 And why don't you just -- let's start, just how did your day start on the 6th? And what
14 did you observe as far as crowd size goes?

15 A Certainly. My morning started about the 5 o'clock in the morning. I got
16 into the city across the TR bridge, the Teddy Roosevelt bridge. Came down Constitution
17 Avenue and stopped on Constitution Avenue and realized that already at that moment in
18 time that they had a row of sanipots along the south curb line of Constitution Avenue
19 from 15th over to 17th. They had the bike racks set up for, like, what we call
20 Disney-style entry through the bike racks to queue the crowd and then what should about
21 been a designated 20 foot of fire lane for first responders.

22 And all the queuing had already been overwhelmed by people. There was
23 people solidly in the 20-foot fire lane. You could barely see the sanipots already and
24 noted a crowd that was already going back up towards Washington Monument grounds,
25 down the sidewalk through there, about 5 and 6 deep wide, and already back up almost

1 to the top of Washington Monument Hill.

2 Q So what was -- kind of what changed in your plan for the day once you
3 observed that crowd size?

4 A I knew that this was going to be large, much larger than anybody had on
5 paper understood this to be. I also noted there's a teleprompter or a big screen that
6 had been put up as well for the crowd that was over where the Washington Monument
7 was. And that is something that had not been discussed through the planning cycle
8 either. So, at this moment in time, I realized that this was just not going to be an event
9 on the Ellipse itself, that it was actually going to involve Washington Monument grounds.
10 So I repositioned over to 15th Street for a little bit, continued to watch the crowd
11 continuing to grow. I did take a drive down toward, around 3rd Street Northwest and
12 came back around Independence Avenue, so basically made a horseshoe down around
13 toward the Capitol, came back down toward Independence, and stayed on 15th Street
14 most of the morning. And the crowd just kept getting bigger and bigger and bigger and
15 bigger through the morning.

16 Q So we have talked a little bit about crowd size, but then I also want to ask,
17 was there -- were there any events or moments in your mind that indicated to you that
18 not only was the crowd going to be big, but there were going to be some additional issues
19 as far as unrest?

20 A So, not only the crowd was getting bigger by the minute, I saw the veteran
21 groups showing up in their helmets, and their vests, the armored-plate carriers and things
22 like that. Started to see a lot of people with the Gadsden flag showing up, saw a group
23 with orange hats show up and kind of stay together.

24 But we got a call for a man with a gun that had climbed one of the trees on the
25 south side of Constitution Avenue on Washington Monument grounds that had a direct

1 line into the Ellipse to the main entrance of the Ellipse there on 16th Street. And the
2 crowd was so dense, we wanted to address that by trying to get a team in to extract him,
3 but our concern at that point was sending law enforcement into that crowd and engaging
4 that subject where we would create a dangerous crowd surge or some type of use of our
5 firearms or his firearm. So we decided the best course of action was to put plain-clothes
6 assets around him so when he came can down, we could address that criminal violation
7 or that criminal activity.

8 We also started getting calls for suspicious items that morning as well around the
9 sanipots. I was the closest SOD official that morning, Special Operations Division official.
10 It took me a good 20 minutes to walk into that crowd, and it took me another good 20
11 minutes to walk out of that crowd. It was so densely packed; it was very hard to get in
12 and out. There was no longer a 20-foot fire lane. The queuing was already overspilled.

13 And we -- again, all I could do was kind of stay back on 15th Street to kind of keep
14 observing things. At that moment in time, when we had this happening, there was no
15 indications that there was going to be movement of that crowd. We had one of our
16 traffic units at 14th and Independence call out the three individuals walking with what
17 appeared to be long guns, AR-style long guns. I responded there to help investigate
18 that. That got very contentious between the crowd that was coming toward the
19 Washington Monument grounds, stopped to observe this interaction between us and
20 these three individuals. So we had to actually deploy some Civil Disturbance Units to set
21 up a perimeter around that so we could fully investigate and mitigate that incident.

22 We found that they were parts of weapons, all of which, unfortunately, are legal
23 in the District of Columbia to have in your immediate possession. None of the
24 individuals were wanted or anything like that, so we did do a report. And we kind of
25 had to send them on their way at that point.

1 I broke away from that and got a call from my bureau chief, Assistant Chief Jeffrey
2 Carroll, notifying me that they had found what was believed to be a pipe bomb over at
3 the RNC -- I don't remember the sequence of how they were found. So I called our
4 bomb squad sergeant, Sergeant Joseph Dolan. I said: Sergeant Dolan, please respond,
5 over. Join unified command. Let us know what you have. Keep reports coming back.

6 And, not 10 minutes later, I was actually driving down Independence Avenue at
7 that time when I got the second call from Assistant Chief Carroll saying: The Capitol
8 needs help. Get yourself and resources to the Capitol to help the Capitol.

9 So, getting that notification, I immediately requested three of our Civil
10 Disturbance Unit platoons to meet me at 3rd and Maryland Avenue, Southwest. And I
11 said that we were going to stage in the 200 block of Maryland Avenue by the Botanical
12 Gardens.

13 Q I will stop you there just for one second. We will kind of get everything
14 done leading up to the response to the call.

15 Did you have some questions?

16 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

17 Q Commander Glover, earlier in our conversation, you mentioned that, with
18 respect to the two groups antifa and Proud Boys, that antifa were very anti-law
19 enforcement, and that Proud Boys were trying to inure themselves to law enforcement.
20 What was your sense at this point in your day as you are telling your story -- what was
21 your sense of what the crowds response to law enforcement was then? Did you feel it
22 was the same? Was it different? Had it shifted? What was your sense did the crowd
23 in general and how they felt about law enforcement on that day?

24 A That morning when I walked into the crowd, it was almost indifferent, when
25 I tried to get through the crowd to go look for that first suspicious item.

1 But, at 14th and Independence, there was a sense of hostility toward us at that
2 point when we investigated that incident at 14th and Independence. We actually did
3 have to establish police lines with our Civil Disturbance Unit, which was unusual. That
4 was different from what had happened in November and December. So there was some
5 angst with the people flowing into that that we had not experienced in November and
6 December.

7 Q And did that level of angst remain constant throughout the day? Did it go
8 up? Did it go down?

9 A It -- for me personally having broken away from 14th and Independence to
10 just go down to Independence when I got that call about the first pipe bomb, my mind
11 shifted into: Okay. We have got this critical incident going on. Let's get somebody
12 down there to figure out what we have.

13 And then, a few minutes later, getting that second phone call: Hey the Capitol
14 needs help.

15 So the crowd dynamics later in the day were much different than what we
16 experienced in November and December. And we can get into that as we move forward
17 through the day, but it was definitely not something that we were expecting.

18 Mr. [REDACTED]. Thank you, sir.

19 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

20 Q And talking about sort of the reaction of the crowd as it relates to antifa's
21 typical reaction and Proud Boys' typical reaction, or Oath Keepers, did -- what was your
22 assessment of who was there? Were you seeing an antifa presence that morning?

23 A No. Shockingly, we were prepared to do crowd segregation if we had
24 to -- or crowd separation. But we did not see any antifa in that crowd. This was all
25 pro-Trump, Make America Great Again, Oath Keepers, Proud Boys.

1 We did not see any Patriot Front overtly wearing Patriot Front garb or their
2 standard cannon blue. But this was all pro-Trump, MAGA crowd. We did not see any
3 antifa in the crowd at all.

4 Q And when was the first time that you identified Proud Boys in the crowd?

5 A They weren't wearing their standard black and gold polo shirts. But I
6 recognized some of the faces that had been in some of the leadership roles of the Proud
7 Boys that had been there in November and December. So I could recognize faces. I
8 couldn't tell you names, but I could recognize faces. They just have this aura about
9 them that they kind of stand out. As much as they didn't want to stand out, they did
10 stand out that day.

11 Q What -- if you can describe it, what made them stand out?

12 A They don't go anywhere by themselves. They always stay together, at least
13 2 or 3 together. They moved separately in their little groups together. I have to
14 describe it as -- again, this is personal, so, when I say this, they just -- they are White
15 supremacy. Just call it what it is. And they just put out this standoffish bubble around
16 them. And, if they'd be in the crowd, they would try to be standing off to their side.

17 They always try to stay together. They don't want them separated out because
18 they fight in groups. So kind of like they have this mentality of one goes, they all go.
19 So you could see them moving around, and they stayed pretty tight together that
20 morning. But you definitely -- I could definitely see them in the crowd in peripheral.

21 The orange hat group kind of threw me for a loop. I didn't really know who they
22 were. That was kind of the first time I had seen orange hats showing up en masse like
23 that. But also what raised my attention was the number of Gadsden flags that were
24 there. I mean, I'd seen them before, but these were an overwhelming number of
25 Gadsden flags.

1 It was just -- it was a very -- it was a concerning moment. It was very defining
2 about this morning. And the indifference it was kind of showing, it was very markedly
3 different than what we had seen in November and December. And, again, definitely no
4 antifa they -- we were prepared to intercept. We kind of know you where antifa likes to
5 assemble: Dupont Circle, Meridian Hill Park, Lafayette Park. We weren't seeing them,
6 Franklin, McPherson, Farragut. We just didn't see any of the antifa assemblers.

7 But, again, we had resources in place to kind of monitor and segregate if we
8 needed to keep them separated. But we just didn't see antifa.

9 Mr. [REDACTED]. Did you -- Commander Glover, you've mentioned you were
10 surprised you didn't see antifa. Were you expecting to see them based on something
11 you had learned before, based on intel reports or threat assessments, or sort of what
12 made you surprised -- I guess another way of asking the question is, why were you
13 expecting them to be there, and then why were -- which led to your surprise about them
14 not being there?

15 Commander Glover. Historically, through October, November, December, they
16 would always pop up somewhere. Whether it be small numbers or larger numbers, but
17 this time we just didn't see them. And normally, when -- if they know the Proud Boys
18 are going to be there or Patriot Front is going to be there, something that is really counter
19 to what they believe in, they just normally will pop up and, even if it is one or two, will
20 always have something happening. They will show up and voice, but we just did not see
21 any of that counter side that morning. We just didn't see it. It never -- it never
22 realized.

23 Mr. [REDACTED]. Thank you, sir.

24 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

25 Q Were you, during the morning and then into kind of the middle of the day,

1 were you tracking what was happening at the Ellipse rally, and by that I mean who was
2 speaking or what was happening with the crowd at the Ellipse?

3 A As best as I could. Our JOC, our Joint Operations Command Center, was
4 activated, and we use a command text string with all the SOD officials, Special Operation
5 Division officials, and HSB officials, Homeland Security Bureau officials. Our job was
6 pushing out updates as best as they could. We knew when POTUS took the stage, but
7 we weren't getting a running list or updates of who else was on stage at that point.
8 Because it was POTUS, it is kind of -- no matter who sitting POTUS is, that's your primary
9 focus, the protection of the President, irrespective of party alignment. It's -- that's the
10 importance of protecting the President at that point. So we weren't getting the other
11 updates of the speakers talking or anything like that. This was kind of more focused on
12 how we go back into a POTUS protection mode.

13 Q Do you remember at all hearing about President Trump's speech and when
14 he directed folks at the Ellipse to march to the Capitol? Were you aware that that had
15 happened?

16 A After the fact.

17 Q Okay, after the fact. So, during the day, you didn't realize that?

18 A No.

19 Q And then I wanted to play for you -- so we have the MPD radio transmissions
20 from that day, and I wanted to play for you a bit around this time as the crowd was
21 starting to shift toward the Capitol, I will ask you just a couple of questions about it.

22 [Video shown.]

23 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

24 Q So a couple of questions about that. When do you recall or can you
25 describe when you first started to realize that the crowd was going to start marching

1 towards the Capitol?

2 A Certainly. So I talked about the incident at 14th and Independence. As
3 we were wrapping up there, I looked -- I just happened to look over my shoulder to the
4 north on 14th Street and saw a significantly large group of about 300. And that's when I
5 saw the orange hats again walking eastbound from 15th Street on the south side of the
6 national African American History Museum, walking eastbound down toward the Mall.
7 And I could look further north and saw a group, a large group that caught my attention
8 moving east down Constitution Avenue. I didn't know their destination, but it was
9 unplanned, and it wasn't something that we were expecting. And, as you can hear, I
10 used the term ad hoc. And I was communicating with now the Commander of Special
11 Operations Division Commander Bradshaw (ph). At the time, he was the planning
12 lieutenant 8651.

13 And I wanted to make sure that Constitution Avenue was secured from vehicles,
14 and he was able to do that and assure me that we were secure for people to walk down
15 Constitution Avenue.

16 And leaving 14th and Independence is when I again got the phone call about the
17 first pipe bomb. But didn't know where they were going to go; I just knew that we had a
18 breakaway of the crowd heading east.

19 Q So is the march that you were referring to and that call, as far as you
20 remember, was the Proud Boys?

21 A Some of the Proud Boys were in that, and it was the orange hats and a lot of
22 Gadsden flags at that point. And that was the group that had broken away and had
23 started moving eastbound.

24 Q Of the group that you identified that was kind of marching together down
25 the Mall, was that -- what percentage of those had the orange hats versus those that

1 were just kind of in plain clothes?

2 A I would say a good 50 percent, maybe give or take, and the same thing with
3 the Gadsden flags. It was noticeable. They stood out. The orange hats really made
4 them stand out.

5 Q And then one thing that we will talk about in a little bit, obviously, is that
6 there's a large congregation of rioters that ends up happening around the Peace
7 Monument. Do you know where I am talking about?

8 A Yes.

9 Q And, in that radio transmission we just listened to, at one point near the end,
10 somebody came over the radio and said it will dump down onto 3rd Street. So I just
11 wanted you to describe the way that the roads were blocked off and kind of how the
12 crowd was going. Was that Peace Monument congregation sort of inevitable? Was it
13 geographic and roadblock features that would have lead people in that direction, or do
14 you think they chose that spot?

15 A I think inevitably they would have to end up there because I do know the
16 Capitol had established bike racking down along First Street around the two circles, Peace
17 and Grant Circle. So I knew the perimeter had been bike-racked. And, again, we were
18 prepare to isolate our area for the Ellipse to keep traffic away as east to 9th Street. That
19 was the initial plan. And we always built in contingencies in as well, too. And, again,
20 even if we are not closing traffic, those uniformed members assigned to those posts that
21 may not necessarily be closer are still eyes and ears about what is going on and be able to
22 respond to something that may occur in that immediate area.

23 So, geographically, as you come down Constitution Avenue, if traffic's isolated and
24 you are running into a bike rack fence, it would naturally stop them there at that eastern
25 most perimeter, which would have been the bike racking for the Capitol Police.

1 Q Okay. We have been going for a little over an hour now, an hour and a
2 half. Do you want to take a break? We are about to kind of get into the call on
3 January 6th and when you approach the west front.

4 A Can I just get some water?

5 Q Okay. Yeah. Let us go into recess then at 10:27.

6 [Recess.]

7 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

8 Q We well get back on the record at 10:33.

9 Okay. So I think we had sort of gotten right up to the moment where you are
10 called to the Capitol. And if you can just describe that call coming in for me?

11 A Certainly. So, after receiving the information about the first pipe bomb and
12 having directed our bomb squad sergeant to go down there, I continued eastbound on
13 Independence Avenue, and maybe a couple minutes later I got a call from Assistant Chief
14 Carroll saying: Hey, Capitol needs help on the west front.

15 Go up there and kind of help. So I notified our Civil Disturbance Unit coordinator
16 who tracks all the platoons. I asked for three platoons, to have them meet me at Third
17 and Maryland Avenue, Southwest. I identified the 200 block of Maryland Avenue by the
18 Botanical Gardens as a staging area.

19 As soon as the platoons got there, I left one-third -- I left the third platoon in
20 reserve, and I briefed the two platoons I was going to take up with me to the west front
21 and get them organized. And we immediately started walking on foot up toward the
22 west front. And we came in from the south walkway from the Botanical Gardens from
23 around the south circle, up and around.

24 As I approached, I could see the bike rack to my north had already been broken
25 open, and I did not see any Capitol Police at that point in time. As we continued up

1 around the walk up around the pathway, I asked some of the Capitol officers I did see
2 along that foot travel up: Where do you need us?

3 And they just said: Keep going around, keep going around.

4 So, as we get to the west front ultimately, we dropped down on to the lowest side
5 of the platform, the inaugural platform. And I immediately saw Capitol Police was trying
6 to hold a police line with confrontations already ongoing between the crowd that had
7 come over to the west front. And I look above me, and I see Capitol Police had a pepper
8 ball team up above the perch above me. And it was so bad at that point, I yelled up:
9 What are you doing? Keep firing keep firing, keep putting pepper ball down.

10 I looked around for a Capitol command official. I saw one of their deputy chiefs
11 in the area, but I couldn't link up with him. I just couldn't keep a hold of him at that
12 point.

13 Q I am going to pause you right there just for one second. Can you describe
14 to me the first time that you get visibility on the west front or on the west plaza and just
15 kind of get us in your mindset? What is your immediate assessment? And just like
16 crowd size, crowd demeanor, describe that for us.

17 A Certainly. I would estimate the crowd size at that moment in time a couple
18 thousand. They were hostile toward law enforcement. They were pushing and
19 shoving. They were going hand to hand with the officers, the Capitol Police officers that
20 were already deployed. I can see a lot of pushing and shoving. I did see Capitol Police
21 officers were already hurt.

22 I couldn't find that deputy chief to link up with him to figure out exactly what they
23 needed or wanted us do. So I had to make an immediate assessment. And I just took
24 the two platoons that came up with me on foot, I said: Integrate with the Capitol Police
25 on the line.

1 And, at that point in time, I had to assume that they wanted to hold the crowd
2 right there.

3 I immediately called for the third platoon to come up out of reserves because we
4 were already outnumbered. And we stayed there for some time, trying to hold that
5 line. I made additional calls for help, additional platoons to be sent to me. We
6 brought more platoons up, and as they arrived, I again assigned them to just get down on
7 the line, filter in and strengthen up areas.

8 I called for our Domestic Security Operations Unit with the munitions, crowd
9 control munitions, to come up. And, at that point in time, it was a riot much earlier
10 before I declared it -- I kind of lost track, but that was a matter of formality. But it was
11 already riotous conditions at that moment in time. More than five people acting in
12 concert, posing a grave risk to life and property.

13 So I also called for authorization of use. You'll hear PLUTOP (ph), which is our
14 highest level use of force in crowd, control, which is CS gas, and got almost instantaneous
15 approval to use CS.

16 Q I'll pause you there for one second again. I'm sorry if I keep interrupting.
17 I'm just going to -- as you go, which is great, I want that narrative, I'm just going to pause
18 and ask you to kind of zero in on moments or aspects of what is going on. And so the
19 first one I want to ask you about is, what did you see as far as instruments or weapons
20 that the crowd was using, or did you observe that, sir?

21 A The crowd, a significant number of the crowd had helmets, plate carriers. I
22 could see ear pieces for the radios, high-end encrypted radios that are capable of being
23 encrypted. I would say military grade. Gas masks. They were using pieces of bike
24 rack. They were using the legs from the bike rack. They had already started to
25 disassemble some of the scaffolding that had been built, the inaugural platform. They

1 had bear spray, which is a very strong form of cesium capsicum (ph), which is pepper
2 spray but at a much more robust level. They were using flag poles, both wooden and
3 metal. They were picking up water bottles and throwing water bottles. And, later in
4 the day, they were using heavier items, such as big 50-pound fire extinguishers. They
5 were using anything that was loose around them that they could use.

6 We again tried to maintain that line. With all the platoons were coming up, I just
7 kept assigning the platoons to strengthen the line. A lot of the weaponry was metal,
8 and, again, that was from the bike rack. They were able to get the legs off the bike rack.
9 Again, they were doing heavy metal couplers of the scaffolding. They got some of those
10 off. They were using fisticuffs with their bare hands and, again, the flag poles, both
11 wooden and metal.

12 Q Okay.

13 A They were using pretty much anything they could as a weapon at that point.

14 Q And then can you -- could you give me an assessment of when you first
15 arrived how large the crowd was and then just describe for me how quickly the crowd
16 grew?

17 A I do lose sense of time. So, as this evolved from my arrival, the crowd
18 continued to grow significantly, to the point where Capitol Police made a decision to pull
19 their members back inside the building. I lost my strength on the north flank, and I had
20 to sector the west front to west, which was the platform itself to the north, which was
21 looking toward the Senate side, and to the south was obviously looking towards the
22 House side.

23 But, as Capitol recalled inside, it pulled enough officers off that north flank that
24 my line started to bend back in and we were starting to get surrounded and flanked out.
25 I had to make a decision at that point to pull us off of that lower level up to the higher

1 level. I used -- told them to get to the south stairwell of the inaugural platform. I kind
2 of waited at the bottom to make sure all -- that I could see MPD members had made it
3 up. And I remember dragging one of our last officers up the platform because he had
4 already been overcome by our chemical munitions. And we put out a lot of product, we
5 used -- we started with OC. We started with the special impact munitions. We had
6 already deployed some CS as well. We were hampered by the platform design itself and
7 the wind coming from the north. It's called mechanical wind. The tarpaulin or the
8 white tarpaulin over the structure itself just bent the wind on us. So, as we were
9 deploying, you could tell from where I was looking out, I could see the crowd was
10 sectored. And what do I mean by sectored? I could see the orange hats what
11 appeared to me strategically placed through the crowd. And I could also see the
12 Gadsden flags, the "don't tread on me" flags, strategically postured through the crowd as
13 well.

14 I could see those had individuals with the orange hats and with the flags. As we
15 were trying to hold the line, as we were pushed, say, on the north, they'd hit us strong on
16 the south. And they were directing with hand signals and flag movements; you could
17 see this from my observations looking out over -- so, as we were pushing strong north,
18 they would push us on the south, and we had to keep adapting. So everything we were
19 doing, they were countering in a very organized fashion.

20 And then, closer in, the crowd was so dense that the result of our munitions
21 deployments were not as effective as what we would have expected. The CS powder
22 could not penetrate the crowd. The OC was only effective for maybe two or three
23 people in versus a larger swath of the crowd. And the specialty impact weapons with
24 their protective equipment that they were wearing became very ineffective.

25 One of our sergeants, Sergeant Bow (ph), actually ended up using his issued ECD,

1 electronic control device, also known as taser. He tased one individual to effect a
2 desired outcome. He ended up using several other ECDs in sequential order when he
3 ran out of cartridges. That seemed to be most effective when he had that deployments;
4 it would kind of pause things for just a quick second. But, like I said, when Capitol made
5 the decision to pull back into the building itself, it left that north flank very weak. And I
6 didn't have enough resources at that moment in time to hold that. So, instead of
7 getting flanked and surrounded, I had to pull us out, again drug that last member up the
8 stairs, and we landed up at the very top.

9 Q We are going to get to kind of when that line breaks and you move up to the
10 lower west terrace. So just a couple more specific questions about the early portion of
11 the fighting.

12 Can you describe for me -- I know you mentioned right when you came onto the
13 west front plaza, there were already Capital Police officers that were injured. Can you
14 describe to me the sorts of injuries that you were seeing members suffered, both Capitol
15 Police and MPD?

16 A I did see several Capitol members suffering from the effects of bear spray.
17 You could see the dye marking out of the bear spray. You could see the orange on their
18 faces. They suffered from lacerations from being hit in the head with items, such as the
19 flag poles, the metal pieces of the bike rack. Sheer exhaustion, some of them just were
20 exhausted. I remember walking through blood on the platform only to find out after the
21 fact that one of our officers, one of our officers whose hand got pinched in the bike rack
22 and lost a piece of his hand. One of the platoons that I initially took up was a bicycle
23 platoon. Their equipment truck got stuck in some of the traffic, and they didn't have
24 time to get their equipment. So they came up without gas masks. So the product that
25 we were putting out was so copious that they suffered a lot of ill effect very quickly.

1 They stayed out there as long as they could. I end up having to reassign them off the
2 line to basically help start triaging and protecting some of the injured Capitol and injured
3 MPD officers that we couldn't get into the building.

4 The -- our officers from MPD were taking hits to the helmets. They were
5 taking -- their hands were getting fighting over the bike rack, they were getting smacked
6 down with flag poles on their hands. They were getting poked with the poles. One got
7 hit in the head with a fire extinguisher, and, later in the day, they got thrown down. So
8 we suffered various types of injuries.

9 Q I know obviously you and MPD and Capitol Police were using OC spray. I
10 understand that the rioters also were using their own sprayer. Is that right?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And how -- were there a lot of folks -- a lot of rioters using OC or bear spray?
13 Just describe that for me a little bit.

14 A It -- I couldn't give you an exact number. It was significant enough that you
15 could see, as they were spraying, it was impacting our members on the line pretty, pretty
16 heavily. I had our members mask up fairly early on. As soon as I started deploying the
17 CS, we masked up as best as we could. I tried to mask up myself at a period of time. I
18 just couldn't communicate through the mask so I ended up trying to keep a KN-95 mask
19 on myself. At that point, I had to give that up and just had to fight through it, but you
20 could smell it.

21 And the effects of the bear spray are much longer lasting than even our law
22 enforcement issued OC. It's got a higher Scoville unit than what our OC does. It's
23 meant to stop a 500- to 1,000-pound animal. So imagine what it does to a human being.
24 And it can actually cause thermal burns as well if you don't decon quickly enough.

25 Q When you say decon?

1 A Fresh air, lots and lots of water, getting that off of you. And it's also -- it's
2 not necessarily as regulated as what is issued to law enforcement. So there are other
3 additives that may get put into it. Some people make their own. That was the other
4 thing that was being thrown too is what we -- probably human feces and human urine, as
5 you could smell it. There were a lot of smells that day.

6 Q I am lucky enough that I have never felt the effects of OC spray or bear
7 spray. Can you just describe to me what it feels like to be hit with that?

8 A So getting hit with our OC law enforcement is the product is designed to
9 cause immediate closure of your eyes and rhinorrhea. And what I mean by rhinorrhea is
10 severe tearing and production of your snot. It's -- and it's to disorient and incapacitate
11 without physical force. And the way you get rid of that from that impact or those
12 consequences is you got to get that person into fresh air first. So remove yourself from
13 the contaminated environment. And then you want to do copious amounts of water
14 and getting that product off. They do make some other things to decon with, but we
15 have always taught that you use fresh air first, lots of water, and baby shampoo or Dawn
16 dish detergent. But we didn't have that. We had limited fresh air, and we had very
17 limited water that at that point.

18 Q And how about -- I don't know if you felt it at all, but the bear spray that the
19 rioters were using, was there a different effect of that, or it is just magnified?

20 A It's magnified. And like say if it is left on for too long, it can cause actual
21 thermal burns. That's how high the Scoville unit is in that product and also that dye.
22 And, again, it's not -- I don't want to say regulated. It is not an industry standard
23 whereas the law enforcement product is. There's always material safety data sheets.
24 There's training. There's -- you know, everything that goes in that, you know what is in
25 that product, because you may have to testify about it later, versus the bear spray, it is a

1 sportsman's industry. And, you know, it's not really regulated. It is not being sold to
2 law enforcement. It is being sold to the general public. So a manufacturer can put
3 anything and everything in there, and you wouldn't know it.

4 Q And then I also want to ask a little bit more about the crowd coordination
5 that you were observing. A couple of different things. One, you mentioned the use of
6 hand signals. What were the sorts of hand signals that you were seeing? And then if
7 you can talk about, you know, did this seem effective to you? Were people responding
8 to the hand signals?

9 A I can answer the second question easier. Yes, it was effective. And then
10 the various signals you would see is you could see them point it this way. They'd move
11 their arm up, or they'd do this, and people were responding to that. And, again, I think
12 about it in combat; this is almost like a combat controller for the crowd. And, again,
13 they were obviously watching what we were doing because, like we say, we would strong
14 push on, say, on the north, and then we would get next unit, and we'd get a crowd surge
15 on the south. And they were reading what we were doing. They were very akin to
16 what we were doing, and they were adapting what they were doing in the crowd. So
17 they were -- and then you could see this closed fist above, and it is like hold. You could
18 see flag movements waving to the right or the left, kind of like in a forward. So, if it
19 wasn't someone using hand signals, you could see the flags moving as well too. And I
20 could see that from where I was up there. You could look down and see this.
21 Constantly scanning for what was going on.

22 And another decision that played into why we had to pull out of that lower side or
23 that lower level is we started seeing people -- they were already up into the press
24 structures. And we also started -- or I actually knew that they were up below us, coming
25 underneath the stands, underneath the white tarpaulin, which you couldn't necessarily

1 see from the outside, but you see underneath. And you could see them trying to come
2 up from below us. And then you could start seeing onesies, twosies, starting to get up
3 that high, and they start getting up on even higher ground in the actual seated area of the
4 bleachers. All the reason why we just had to get out from that lower level. We had
5 stuff -- that's when we started getting stuff coming down from the top of us.

6 Q I want to focus here a little bit on this idea of crowd coordination a little bit
7 because it is something that we tried to understand and get an accurate assessment of.
8 And, you know, obviously, we know that there were small groups -- well, small to large,
9 depending on what group you are talking about, that were in communication before the
10 6th and were talking about how the day was going to unfold for them. And then there
11 were a lot of folks that were just kind of individual First Amendment attendees that go
12 there and then kind of get wrapped up in what is going on.

13 So I guess one question is the crowd kind of coordination that you were seeing,
14 was it your impression that it was, like, an individual who was just there on that day and
15 trying to communicate just to the random group of people around him saying, like, "hey,
16 push forward here," or were you seeing a different level of coordination that seemed like
17 preplanning organization among very large groups? Do you understand the distinction I
18 am making? Because we have definitely seen lots of people and like, "hey, push
19 forward, push forward," and just talking to whoever was around them.

20 A No. This was -- this is my opinion: It was well coordinated, well planned
21 with I would believe some type of military or combat or tactical experience. Very
22 familiar with law enforcement processes and tactics that we were using, and they knew
23 how to counter them. That doesn't come overnight. That don't come at an ad hoc
24 moment.

25 When I debriefed with the Bureau, I actually said this to them, I said: It almost

1 seems like this was a War College exercise, how do I take the Capitol? It was very
2 apparent that this had been well thought out, well planned. You could tell that this was
3 not some willy-nilly movement. Again, they were watching what we were doing, and
4 they were able to counter that. They were familiar with what we were -- and they knew
5 to what to expect from the munitions as well too. I think, knowing that the wind was
6 coming from the north, they concentrated on the north stairwell. That was one of the
7 hardest points of the day to focus on. They concentrated to the north, knowing as we
8 were putting out munitions, in my mind, all that was coming back on to us versus them
9 because that wind just carried it. So they were using the wind, in my opinion, to their
10 advantage, as well to our disadvantage.

11 Q And then, on the point of radios, what things were you observing other than
12 I know you said you saw the radios themselves and you saw ear pieces? Did you ever
13 see kind of any specific instances of a radio communication, what was being said, or
14 somebody responding to a radio communication?

15 A No. I could not hear the radios. Again, most of them that I saw with
16 those radios on their chest carriers or the chest plate carriers had the earwigs in. I
17 couldn't hear their comms. Again, I had a pretty good distance from myself to some of
18 those folks that were further back in the crowd. The ones that I could hear up front on
19 the front line I know I personally deployed less lethal platform, and he looked me square
20 inch the face, and he said: Is that all you got?

21 And, again, the crowd was so dense that, you know, the expected outcome of that
22 deployment was the guy just kind of looked at me and said: Is that all you got?

23 So that's the amount of verbal communication I had with them.

24 I had to kind of had to remove myself and put myself into a space where I knew I
25 had injured officers going down and literally no place to put them other than behind

1 some of the features up there for self-protection but that I just had to keep focus on
2 maintaining that line and reacting to what they were doing and try to keep as many of us
3 as safe as we could.

4 Q Were there -- in the first part of the confrontation, the battle on the plaza,
5 were there resources that you didn't have that you were asking for or that you wish that
6 you had had? And what were those resources?

7 A I would have loved to have quadrupled what we were able to produce, but
8 we employed every platoon that was available at the time from the MPD side. We --

9 Q How large is a platoon, by the way?

10 A It's 33. So it's 1 lieutenant, 4 sergeants, and 28 officers.

11 We mobilized our outside agency help, which was Montgomery, Arlington, and
12 Prince George's County. So we made that call, even though they were prepositioned in
13 time to spin them up and get them. We had already assigned officers to be with them
14 to help coordinate and guide. And then I called for Virginia State as well too. They had
15 a contingency staged up at their Arlington field office. I did call for the Park Police force
16 mounted unit. My intention of using the horses were to come in on the grass itself and
17 to kind of shut off some of the backside of that crowd to kind of weaken the crowd from
18 behind and kind of divide the crowd's attention. Again, a tactic where if they are not all
19 the focus is on one way, kind of split their attention and give us a little more space. But I
20 did not get the horses.

21 Ultimately, I found out they still were worried about what was still going on at the
22 Ellipse. The activities at the Ellipse were still taking place. We were obviously
23 concerned. You know, Park Police has its own jurisdiction they still have to protect as
24 well, too, such as the Washington Monument, all the monuments and the Smithsonians
25 and things like that.

1 I did call for their pepper ball team to come up. Their pepper ball team did get
2 there once we pulled up to the upper terrace. And I assigned them to a specific area
3 underneath the south bleachers, basically to keep that area secure so they couldn't come
4 up underneath me.

5 So going, once we get up to that upper terrace, on the way up, I did send -- I was
6 still hearing some of our radio traffic about activity inside the Capitol; they needed help
7 inside. So I sent some resources inside to what now is known as the tunnel of doom. I
8 refer to it as the tunnel of doom. I did blindly send some platoons in there, some
9 personnel in there as we were going up, and that's how Commander Kyle (ph) ended up
10 getting separated from me and going into there. We get everybody up to that upper
11 terrace. Like I said, Park Police was assigned that south bleacher area underneath of it;
12 that was their focus. More and more crowd had got up into the bleacher area at this
13 point. So I assigned our emergency response team to start clearing out the high ground
14 from the top side of me.

15 Q I'm going to pause you there. One more time again. And I want to ask
16 about the decision by Capitol Police to call officers back into the Capitol. I am going play
17 again a piece of the transmission.

18 [Video shown.]

19 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

20 Q So just a couple more questions about that. When did you -- I know you
21 said you kind of lost track of time, but if you can put it kind of in context of closer to when
22 you first arrived, when you lost or when the line on the west front plaza kind of broke and
23 you moved up to the lower west terrace, when did you realize the Capitol Police were
24 moving their members back into the building?

25 A So the voice from the radio transmission was Director Mantagno (ph), he's in

1 charge of our JSAC side or the JOC at the time. I did hear the transmission, but I thought
2 they were just taking the rifle officers back in. But I didn't realize that they pulled
3 everybody until my line started to bend. I looked up, and every Capitol uniform that
4 was out there was gone. And that north side just started to bend, and I knew that we
5 were in bad, bad way at that point. And that's when I had to make the decision to get
6 us off that lower side and get up to the higher ground.

1 [11:03 a.m.]

2 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

3 Q She mentioned starting with, I think she said N4 officers?

4 A M4 --

5 Q M4.

6 A -- the long-gun officers.

7 Q Okay.

8 And then I'm going to play another bit of the radio transmission, just to ask you to
9 kind of describe what was happening here.

10 [Audio recording played.]

11 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

12 Q Let me pause it there, and then I'm going to play a second portion.

13 But, first, when you say they've breached the scaffold, can you just describe
14 exactly what -- that breach point, and then where rioters were going from there?

15 A So, as Capitol pulled off their officers from my north flank, as they pulled off,
16 my line bent. And as soon as my line bent, they were able to use that north stairwell
17 and underneath the north-side scaffold to get in behind us. And you can see as they
18 started to literally come in behind our officers. And I just couldn't get flanked. But
19 that's -- that was the end result of Capitol pulling off.

20 Q Okay.

21 Can you describe, also, the -- is the complication of the scaffold that that structure
22 is preventing you from, kind of, protecting the back side of your line? Is that what's
23 happening?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Okay.

1 A And also not being able to fully see because of the white bunting, the white
2 wrap. I couldn't really see the entire picture underneath, about how many people were
3 trying to come up underneath me. And it prevented us from extending past -- I just -- I
4 didn't have enough of MPD resources to fill in what got taken away by the Capitol.

5 Q And then I also just kind of want to ask about -- this is more, kind of, the
6 emotional side of that day for you. But, obviously, there's, you know, intense fighting
7 going on at this time that you're making these radio transmissions, and you can hear in
8 your voice, kind of, the increase of activity and the increase of violence.

9 Can you just put that in perspective for me, kind of, looking back on your career,
10 you know, as compared to other, kind of, high-intensity moments that you've
11 experienced, what was the day and that battling on the west plaza like for you?

12 A It was the first time in my career I didn't think we were going to go home.

13 We were battle-tested through May and the period of unrest, and I just had faith
14 and confidence in the officers through that period. I had faith and confidence in the
15 officers that I was working with on January 6th, but we were just outnumbered at this
16 point. And once that line broke and they got in behind us, that's never a good thing.

17 I knew there was guns in the crowd, because we'd already dealt with the
18 individual over at the Ellipse. And I was concerned that this was actually going to
19 become a gun battle -- a gun battle at one point.

20 I was just looking at how ineffective our munitions were and not getting the
21 desired outcome of what, in training and experience, it would give us. It didn't buy us
22 anything, other than a little bit of time. But we didn't get the distance, we didn't get the
23 crowd breakaway that we were expecting. It got worse; it just intensified.

24 Q And then there is -- in this portion -- I'm going to play another bit of the radio
25 transmission. This was after you've identified that rioters are coming behind your lines.

1 Let's just listen to this.

2 [Audio recording played.]

3 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

4 Q Can you just explain to me, kind of, what that conversation is and what's
5 happening there?

6 A Sure. That was Chief Carroll asking me and basically giving me permission
7 to basically do a retreat if I felt that was the best way to go. And I couldn't give it up. I
8 knew if I pulled us back in, there was no defending at that point. We would lose
9 everything, and we would have so much more to fight over. I just knew I had to get us
10 up higher, and if I could get us up higher, we had a better chance.

11 I knew what was inside the building. I knew what was at stake. I think every
12 officer out there knew what we were responsible for protecting.

13 We didn't -- that was the hardest decision I had to make, just even pulling off that
14 lower side. But I knew if I didn't do that, we wouldn't be able to fight on the top.

15 Again, I had every faith and confidence in every one of my officers from MPD, but I
16 had to give us a better starting point. I just couldn't go back in the building. Even
17 though I sent resources inside, I just couldn't send us all inside. There'd have been no
18 way to deal with what we were facing from the inside.

19 Q I want to ask you also about, you said at one point you were afraid it would
20 turn into -- that you'd have to use firearms or that the crowd would or you would. And I
21 think that's certainly something, from my perspective, watching that day unfold, I was
22 surprised that didn't happen.

23 Can you just describe that decisionmaking process? What were your fears, or
24 what would've triggered that sort of event? And how did you prevent that from
25 happening?

1 A How we prevented it was our training. We train not to fire into a crowd.

2 But that doesn't -- that doesn't still not allow an individual officer to make a
3 use-of-deadly-force decision on their own part. Some of the assaults that were
4 occurring against our members, take it away from the west front of the Capitol, put on a
5 routine call for police service, and they'd have been more than justified in discharging
6 their firearms.

7 You know, you talk about the edged pipes or the flagpoles and trying to stab
8 officers; you're fighting for your life at that point. You know, do you have a reasonable
9 fear of serious bodily injury or death at that point? And you could very easily say yes.
10 But the officers gutted it out and chose not to, basically, discharge their firearms.

11 And, again, I was not seeing the desired outcome of the munitions. And we have
12 the best munitions that are out there on the product lines, and we train hard with those
13 munitions. We just -- we weren't getting that desired effect.

14 And that also let me know, too, that the crowd -- most of that crowd had been
15 exposed to this stuff before. Somewhere, somewhere in their lives, they knew what to
16 expect and were able to fight through it.

17 Q There was also a point in the radio transmissions, I think, unless I misheard,
18 where you called for air support also? Do you recall doing that?

19 A I could've. I --

20 Q I just was curious about what kind of -- what --

21 A The only thing I would've been able to use them for at that point was, like,
22 better observation.

23 Q Uh-huh.

24 A Wouldn't have been able to really use them for anything else.

25 Sometimes -- the only other desired outcome would've been if they could've

1 gotten low and slow and maybe buzzed them. But, again, you're putting the pilot and
2 the crew at risk. So having it would've been okay, but not having it wouldn't have -- it
3 wouldn't have been a game changer, I don't think.

4 I think the one thing that would've helped me would've been having the horses be
5 able to take off some of the crowd from the back and present a second front for the
6 crowd to concentrate on. I do believe that would've been beneficial.

7 Q Okay.

8 Mr. [REDACTED]. I'm happy to take a break for a few minutes if you need some water
9 or anything. Yeah, let's take a break. Let's go into recess at 11:13.

10 [Recess.]

11 Mr. [REDACTED]. Okay. Let's go back on the record at 11:16.

12 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

13 Q So there's another, kind of, specific moment in the radio transmissions and
14 what's transpiring on the west plaza that I wanted to ask you about. And we could play
15 the radio for that.

16 [Audio recording played.]

17 Q So I want to ask you about that 10-33. What does a "10-33" mean?

18 A It's emergency assistance for any officer, life or death at that moment in
19 time. That's when that line on the north side finally just broke and we just lost it, and
20 we kind of got overrun behind us.

21 And, again, this was pretty close in time to right after the Capitol pulled off and
22 back in. It kind of happened -- it didn't happen instantaneously, but it happened close
23 enough in time. And, again, it's the decisionmaking process of, where do I go? And
24 giving the 10-33 was my hope that anybody else that was listening would've
25 just -- whoever they would've had available would've come out and helped.

1 What this did trigger was, our patrol districts were directed to form what's called a
2 fifth platoon. We normally don't use those platoons unless it's during the inaugural
3 period. So they got Metro buses to all of our district stations and cobbled together a
4 fifth platoon. So they start sending those platoons down to us.

5 And our outside agencies were actually responding already, but, again, where they
6 were staged at and trying to get through the traffic and the nightmare that was down on
7 Independence Avenue, were just -- with the sheer amount of first responder vehicles.
8 When we did get to the upper deck, Montgomery, Arlington, and Prince George's all
9 arrived pretty much simultaneously.

10 Q I'm going to ask you a little bit about the, kind of, interagency and joint
11 operations in a second, but --

12 A Okay.

13 Q -- again, just a little bit focused on the 10-33, can you give us an idea of, you
14 know, how often is it that you use that code on the radio? And what does that mean to
15 other people listening on the radio?

16 A In my career, I've maybe used it four or five times in 27-1/2 years, myself.
17 But when you hear that in general daily activity, it's like the radio stops and you're
18 focused on getting to that officer, wherever they are, because you know it's that bad, that
19 they're fighting for their life; something they're perceiving or seeing or realizing is that
20 their life is in immediate danger.

21 And it's just basically a signal to everybody, no matter what you're doing, you
22 stop, and you're heading there. No matter where you're at, if you're hearing that,
23 you're going to help.

24 Q And, you know, recognizing that you've only heard that code used, you
25 know, four or five times or a handful of times in your career, do you remember, listening

1 to the radio that day, how many -- and not exact number, but just give us an idea -- you
2 know, how many 10-33s were called on that day?

3 A I probably voiced it a couple times. I don't know if anybody else did or not.

4 I kept repeating myself after I declared that to get everybody to safety. With the
5 noise level and them fighting, it was a hopes that, by repeating it multiple times, that they
6 understood -- I wanted it to be very clear in my intention of getting my people off of that
7 lower side and getting up to the top.

8 I don't know if anybody else called one. Again, I -- you talk about sensory
9 deprivation. You lose track of time. And that's what happened to me that day. I lost
10 track of time.

11 Q Okay.

12 So let's now talk about, kind of, the -- you moved up to -- well, first, the decision
13 to move up to the lower west terrace. And then I'll let you just kind of go in there, the
14 response, after that.

15 A Again, all the activity that circled behind us when we got flanked on was to
16 the north, so I used the south stairwell to get us up to the top. As we were moving up, I
17 sent people inside that door, blindly. Didn't know what they were going to be facing.
18 And that's how Commander Kyle ended up going there.

19 As we get to the top and land up on the top, within a few minutes, the
20 contingencies from Arlington, Montgomery County, and Prince George's arrived. We
21 had a quick huddle with myself and their unit commanders there on that top level.

22 Park Police got there, too, with the pepper ball team. Park had the smallest unit
23 with the pepper ball team, so I said, okay, if you all can cover that open scaffold area on
24 the south.

25 Then I looked and I saw Prince George's had the most. So I looked at the Senate

1 courtyard, and I assigned Prince George's County to that courtyard problem. And then I
2 assigned Arlington and Montgomery County to that north stairwell with one of our
3 platoons, CDU 23. And I assigned our emergency response team members to start
4 clearing out the bleachers themselves.

5 I could no longer see the contingent that went in the hallway. And
6 Commander Kyle was there. And trying to transmit from there to there was sporadic at
7 best, and I could no longer see him. But I knew he had a big problem there. And
8 anything I did from the top, it's like squeezing a bottle; the contents have to go out
9 somewhere.

10 But I needed some space up on the top, so -- without hurting him. So my
11 decision was to assign Prince George's to deal with the Senate courtyard first. We all
12 agreed that that was the best option, to skim out that courtyard first.

13 So Prince George's took the front of the line. We had to adapt some of our
14 formations because of how that is outlined with infrastructure. And we had Prince
15 George's -- they were the freshest; they took the main push. And then we backfilled
16 with some of our platoons to kind of hold that area, and at least I had an area of refuge
17 for us.

18 Park kept directing pepper ball underneath that south scaffold to keep them from
19 coming up underneath of us. And then our emergency response teams start taking the
20 bleachers. And then I backfilled in with one of our platoons to kind of hold what we call
21 trailers.

22 And at that moment in time, we start getting some voluntary compliance. And
23 you can see where people in the crowd -- the crowd dynamics and crowd psychology
24 started to shift, and they realized -- they became cooperative, and they start listening to
25 our members' direction, like, get off the platform, go.

1 Q Can I pause you and ask you: Was there anything that triggered that, in
2 your mind, or do you know why the crowd dynamics changed at that point?

3 A I think it was the gravity of everything. I can't speak for them. I just think
4 that they started to realize that this was bad, and they realized that they got in over their
5 heads. I don't think some of the people that were voluntary compliance at that point
6 signed up to be there for that. And I think encountering our emergency response team
7 members sent a different message as well, too. But I think -- I think they understood
8 that this was kind of now the final line in the sand.

9 And while this was ongoing, Virginia State was inbound as well. And I made the
10 decision to have Virginia State stay with Commander Kyle when they got there, to
11 supplement Commander Kyle's work.

12 So we dealt with the first problem of the Senate courtyard. Arlington,
13 Montgomery County, and our platoon 23 started dealing with the north stairwell, as the
14 platoons up there are moving people down. And the sheer height and incline, the
15 sloping, of the inaugural stands makes it very difficult to move a large number of people
16 very quickly. You have to be very careful. And that was a painstaking process.

17 So, once I knew that Commander Kyle had Virginia State helping him -- they wear
18 their yellow visibility vests as part of their field force deployment, which is the equivalent
19 of our Civil Disturbance Unit deployment. As Virginia State helped Commander Kyle, I
20 could look below over the edge and see the first yellow coming out from underneath me.
21 And that's when I turned to Montgomery County and Arlington and said, "Do whatever
22 you gotta do to get that north stairwell open. I need to get that north stairwell open."

23 And it took them a long time to get it done, but we were able to finally put some
24 pressure on that north stairwell in earnest to get that open and clear, because I knew I
25 wasn't squishing down on Commander Kyle at that point.

1 As we were able to push that north stairwell down, ultimately Virginia State came
2 out and formed a big line. Montgomery and Arlington kind of filled in behind them.
3 Our trailing platoon was able to fill in, and we kind of dealt with another set of problems
4 there.

5 As we were going down there, that high 20-, 30-foot gap, we had a hardcore
6 group of maybe 200, 300 in that center section that we had to individually remove from
7 that elevated area and get them off. And we continued our push down to the next
8 feature, which was the separation wall between the marble and the grass.

9 But I also heard on the radio they breached the trailers, the production trailers
10 down on the grass level, from the north side. And we still had people up on the media
11 platforms.

12 So I had more platoons available. I assigned a couple platoons to come down
13 from the Constitution Avenue side, north to south. And as they were coming down that
14 way, they had to stop at each trailer and clear each trailer out to make sure that there
15 was nobody hiding in the trailers.

16 Ultimately, they joined up with our line at that last feature. And, by that time,
17 Fairfax County had gotten there. They were on the south side of the line. We were
18 able to get up over the wall, that final marble wall down on the grass, and we pushed all
19 the way down to 1st Street.

20 And I got word from Chief Carroll that there was a number of FBI agents available,
21 what do I need them to do? I asked them to come down 1st Street from Constitution in
22 a line to kind of secure that in an "L." So they start pushing 1st Street.

23 At that point in time, I told Chief Carroll, I said, I can't push them any further
24 because we have no additional resources on the outside of the complex -- the Capitol
25 complex.

1 So we kind of held there. I went back in. I knew we had resources on the east
2 side as well, too. While we were doing this on the west front, our resources on the
3 inside, jointly I think with Capitol, MPD, and some of the tactical elements that had been
4 activated through ATF and FBI and some of the other teams, were doing room-by-room,
5 hallway-by-hallway clearing here inside.

6 So I walked through; I remember going through the Rotunda out to the east front,
7 and our platoons were able to push all the way to 1st Street on the east front. And DFS
8 had just gotten there, Department of Forensic Sciences, to process the inside scene from
9 the resulting use of force at the Speaker's door.

10 I remember walking through the inside of the Capitol, and I just remember looking
11 around, seeing a bunch of injured officers, both from Capitol and MPD, being treated by
12 members of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Office of Attending Physician, HHS
13 doctors that are assigned to Park Police -- they were there -- and just the look of sheer
14 exhaustion. You could smell that chemical munitions had been deployed inside as well.
15 You could see the destruction.

16 So I come back through. I remember ducking into a bathroom very quickly. I
17 get back out to the west front, talk to Chief Carroll about -- he said the curfew was in
18 effect. And I remember hearing at some point the speaker system saying that, you
19 know, you had to be off the grounds, curfew. And he said, we need to start making
20 lockups.

21 So I start -- I told him, I said, okay, we can do that. And I chose the 200 block of
22 Pennsylvania Avenue parking area as the best way to do that, because I could use the
23 Capitol Reflecting Pool and that grassy area as kind of like that funnel. Without too
24 many resources, I'd be able to box that crowd in and start making lockups.

25 And about that time, the National Guard finally got there on the first bus, and I

1 was able to assign the National Guard to create a secure prisoner cordon using their
2 personnel. So, as we were making arrests, we could walk them back to that secure
3 cordon and get them onto the prisoner transportation unit.

4 As we execute those arrests, the first person that we try to arrest tries to run.
5 They ultimately get him, and he had a gun on him. So I knew that there was probably
6 more guns out there.

7 And then the only Special Operations Division official with rank was Captain
8 Michelle Caron. She's now an inspector assigned to our Fourth District, recently
9 promoted. I'm happy for her. But she was dealing with the hotels that were spotted
10 around the downtown area, from everybody else that, after the Ellipse had concluded,
11 had gone back to the hotels.

12 And this is when we start to see the confrontations between the hotel people and
13 the antifa people that finally did show up in smaller numbers. But because of the
14 citywide curfew at that point, trying to keep the attendees inside the hotels became very
15 problematic, and they started to challenge law enforcement at the hotels.

16 So Prince William County ultimately came in. Prince William County became her
17 resources to help her at the hotels.

18 I went over to the parking lot there on D Street across from Capitol Police
19 headquarters, met New Jersey State Police -- they're the first agency outside of the region
20 that I had contact with -- and got their leadership group together, and I said, "It's not a
21 really sexy assignment, but can you all take the east front? I need to make sure I can
22 relieve some platoons." I had to start relieving some of our members who had been up
23 for a long time. So New Jersey State ended up taking the east front on assignment.

24 Virginia State brought their second wave of personnel in, from Culpeper Division.
25 So Virginia State, with their two divisions, end up taking the east front. And we start

1 relieving our platoons finally, start getting some of the earliest platoons out, and realizing
2 how many members we really did have hurt.

3 And, behind the scenes, our entire command staff -- Chief Contee assigned a huge
4 logistics movement back at headquarters, such as the field trucks trying to get us food
5 and water, trying to make sure that we had everything that we possibly could need en
6 masse to cycle through for the rest of the night, because we knew that we weren't going
7 to be able to go home anytime soon.

8 So, once we concluded all the arrests, I talked to Chief Carroll a couple more times
9 through the night. The hotels finally settled down once we got some significant
10 presence around the hotels.

11 It wasn't probably until 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning that I think I finally was able to
12 come off the clock. And I remember going back to the office and just kind of
13 going -- after -- I don't even think I took a shower. I think I just crashed on my cot and
14 woke up the next day and realized that, you know, we were going to be there.

15 So we ultimately reassigned platoons to stay through the night, keep monitoring
16 the hotels. And then we kind of transitioned into the posture going forward with all the
17 other resources that got brought in to maintain the Capitol complex.

18 And then we had some immediate calls with the Secret Service and the executive
19 steering committee for the inauguration, because we had to kind of re-plan the
20 inauguration at that point.

21 Q I'm going to stop you there, and I've got a couple specific questions for you --

22 A Okay.

23 Q -- one kind of focusing on the National Guard and when they arrived and,
24 sort of, how they arrived.

25 First, you know, listening to the radio transmissions, I hear you calling for other

1 local law enforcement agencies that you've mentioned, like P.G. County and Virginia
2 State. I don't hear a lot of mentions of requesting National Guard.

3 Is that your role? Or what's your -- how do you, kind of, plug in to that process
4 for asking National Guard to come in?

5 A So the deployment orders for the National Guard were constrained that day.
6 They were supposed to be on traffic only and nothing east of 9th Street. So I didn't view
7 them as a necessary resource pool at that point in time. They weren't deployed with
8 their equipment. They're not --

9 Q Can I ask you -- sorry. I heard you say you didn't see them as a "necessary"
10 resource pool?

11 A An available resource pool --

12 Q Okay. Gotcha.

13 A -- at that point. And they're not nimble. They are a huge bureaucracy for
14 any change of status. And we've experienced that through other details where we've
15 used them through the years. They need permission to move one block if you need to
16 adjust them. It's just a very bureaucratic process.

17 And, again, they are not nimble at all. I knew that they did not have their field
18 force equipment with them. That's not what they were out there for. And they had a
19 hard line of 9th Street.

20 So, in my mind, it's like, why waste the time to call for them, because you know
21 you're not going to get them quickly?

22 And that was a decision that, if they were going to be redeployed or refocused,
23 there's a lot of politics that go into deploying the National Guard in a crowd-control
24 fashion.

25 Q And then I've been trying to avoid doing this, but I'll have you, if you don't

1 mind, kind of repeat that answer where you said you didn't view them as an
2 available -- or, I think the first time you said necessary, but -- so let's just pretend I asked
3 you again.

4 I didn't hear on the radio transmissions for requests for National Guard, and why
5 was that?

6 A I didn't view them, in my mind at the moment, as an available resource,
7 knowing that their mission constraints and mission guidelines were nothing further east
8 of 9th Street, and I knew that they did not have their field force or crowd management
9 equipment with them.

10 Q Perfect. Great. Thank you.

11 And then do you -- you know, obviously, we have for our record that we're
12 gathering and facts that we're gathering, but just, in your mind or as you remember it,
13 kind of, when did they arrive? And if you can either place a time on it or, like, if you've
14 lost count of time at that point, kind of put it in relation to events that occurred around
15 that?

16 A Certainly. It was after the decision that we were going to start making
17 curfew arrests in the 200 block of Pennsylvania Avenue. I remember this bus pulling in
18 with the soldiers on it and realizing that they finally arrived. So it was just before we
19 start making the arrests on 200 block of Pennsylvania Avenue for curfew.

20 And I asked them how many they had, and I don't believe it was overwhelming
21 numbers. So I'm like, all right, let's use them for a cordon. So that's what we chose to
22 do. They were best suited at that moment in time to build that secure cordon from the
23 arrest area back into the transportation area.

24 Q And then can you just describe, as far as the, kind of, MPD command
25 structure goes, what are the different -- you know, like, how you directed National Guard;

1 at Chief Carroll's level, what was he directing National Guard to do? Just describe those
2 interactions.

3 A So, at whatever moment in time they got remissioned from traffic control to
4 crowd control or crowd management, I can't speak to. Chief Carroll was working out of
5 the Capitol Police command center, and I was the front incident commander. You look
6 at it as kind of an area command at that point, because, again, we had the Capitol
7 complex and then we had the hotels, and we had few resources left.

8 So, when National Guard got sent to the Capitol complex and I was told they were
9 coming -- I didn't know the exact arrival time; the bus just kind of showed up. It was my
10 decision at that point, looking at their numbers and their capabilities at that moment in
11 time and what was the most pressing activity -- and that was to make the arrests. So I
12 made the decision to deploy them in that cordon versus doing anything else, because I
13 didn't have any other resources to use to build that cordon to maintain the arrests that
14 we were making.

15 And pretty much all the other fighting, per se, had stopped on the Capitol
16 complex. They were the freshest personnel that we had at that moment in time. And,
17 again, they didn't have any significant numbers to really do much else at that moment in
18 time either.

19 Q So, then, is it accurate to say, basically, National Guard were sort of
20 repurposed? You were given a description of their numbers and sort of understood
21 their capabilities, and so you were the one that decided how to use the National Guard?

22 A Correct.

23 Q Okay.

24 And then who were you communicating with on the National Guard side, and
25 what was your description of what their, kind of, purpose or concept of operation was

1 going to be?

2 A I remember it was the -- I want to say it was a captain or a major that was on
3 one of the buses. And I remember telling some of the MPD lieutenants, have them build
4 that cordon. And I kind of relayed the intent, and they kind of -- Guard was good with it.

5 And I said, this is what we need. I think their orders were basically, support us in
6 whatever we told them to do at that moment in time. So there was no resistance to
7 asking them to build that cordon for us.

8 And we kind of leveraged them once we start making the arrests, so that cordon
9 kind of got tighter and tighter to kind of help keep pinching things in a little bit to narrow
10 down our operational space. And they just maintained that security for us.

11 Q And, then, can you give us a rough number of how many National Guard it
12 was that arrived?

13 A I recall seeing two coach buses. I would say maybe 100, 110.

14 Q Okay.

15 A Again, it wasn't an overwhelming number by any means.

16 Q We've heard 135 as a number. That sounds pretty accurate?

17 A Yeah, I believe they had some staff cars and some supporting things, as
18 they -- they had two coach buses, and I think each one of those coach buses are
19 55-passenger buses. And you figure, with equipment, that number is probably a good
20 ballpark number.

21 Q Okay.

22 Then let's -- I want to understand -- this now is a little bit more kind of
23 fact-gathering, a little less for the camera. But if you could, in your mind -- I recognize
24 this is a little bit of a complicated assignment, but -- take the, kind of, outside law
25 enforcement agencies and Federal agencies that helped in the response, and if you could

1 kind of give me, sort of in order of presence and importance, who, in your mind, who are
2 the big players? And then kind of go down the list a little bit to the folks that had a
3 smaller presence, if that makes sense.

4 A Certainly.

5 Q Oh, and then, sorry, one more thing, just to complicate the assignment even
6 more. For each of those, if you had, like, a main point of contact that you were working
7 with or if you can recall, kind of, who would be the person that would have, kind of, the
8 best understanding of that contingent's response.

9 A So Prince George's, Montgomery, Arlington County was preplanned.
10 Virginia State was preplanned to the sense that they weren't going to stage in the city but
11 be available if we needed them. Those were all most important. Without them, we
12 would not have been able to re-secure that west front.

13 Park Police was critical. Although small in number, they held a significant piece
14 of that territory for us with very few numbers because of their capabilities and training
15 and experience.

16 The tactical pieces inside -- there's a COG, Washington Council of Government,
17 agreement when it comes to a tactical response. If we have a large tactical response,
18 that's kind of pre-scripted through those COG agreements about who's going to come and
19 who's going to answer that. So they dealt more with the clearing of the offices space
20 and the hallways and infrastructure.

21 And then the FBI contingency that I used on 1st Street, I was just told they had
22 about 200 agents coming, and they were attired in basically minimal personal protective
23 equipment. And realizing that they're not exposed to crowd management or trained for
24 crowd management, I had to put them in an area where they could at least,
25 numbers-wise, give a presence of deterrence and still try to keep them as safe as

1 possible. So that's the reason why they ended up on 1st Street.

2 The Prince William County that came in, they were best suited for the hotels. I
3 never really had contact with them. They reported to staging and got their assignment
4 out of staging.

5 Fairfax County -- I don't know how Fairfax County ended up here. Their point of
6 contact was a second lieutenant -- I don't even know his name -- and a couple sergeants.
7 And it was like, "Just join the line," and, again, there was no resistance. It's like they
8 were there to help.

9 New Jersey State Police came in through an EMAC request. Again, they had
10 good numbers. They had over 100, I believe it was. And, again, looking at them, they
11 were the freshest. So a good number, so I could figure that the east front was good for
12 them.

13 Maryland State was here. Had contact with the captain over the phone, never
14 face-to-face. There was a lot of resistance from the Maryland State Police about doing
15 work. They brought their Level 1 in, which is the highest-trained field force, CDU,
16 whatever you want to call it, crowd management teams, and they pretty much told us, if
17 it wasn't Level 1, they weren't deploying. So we had a number of troopers from
18 Maryland State that just were kind of useless. And that's not to talk bad about them,
19 but they might as well have not even come in. We could've used them, and they just
20 didn't want to deploy.

21 The other smaller agencies that came in were Transit, Airport, Amtrak. I think
22 UD ended up sending some over here after the Ellipse concluded. Didn't really have
23 points of contact with them. They basically just filled in where gaps were at that point.
24 And we kind of looked at the Capitol complex -- when I talked to Chief Carroll later that
25 night, we really kind of decided we had to maintain from Constitution and Independence,

1 1st to 1st. And we kind of assigned agencies just to kind of maintain the presence in
2 between the MPD platoons best suited and the numbers. So where they ended up is
3 just basically, find a spot and plant, you know. And we kind of went down just how
4 many numbers they could provide at that point in time.

5 Q Okay. That's helpful. Thank you.

6 And then another question -- now I'm just kind of going back. We're no longer
7 going chronological, just hitting a couple different issues.

8 One is: Were you aware at all of President Trump's tweets throughout the day?
9 Obviously, you were distracted, but some of them were directives to the crowd or asking
10 them to pull back. Did you see the effect of those tweets at all, or were you aware of
11 them?

12 A I wasn't aware until after the fact. And, giving the benefit of the doubt,
13 maybe that's when we started seeing some voluntary compliance.

14 But I'm not a big -- I have a Twitter account. I don't understand it; I don't use it.
15 So it's not something I was able to monitor through the day.

16 But, again, I'll give him the benefit of the doubt that maybe that's what helped us
17 a little bit with some of the voluntary compliance.

18 Q Okay.

19 Mr. [REDACTED]. Let's see. Why don't we take -- why don't we go into recess at
20 11:49. I want to take about 5 minutes to just look over my notes and see if there's
21 anything else we need to cover, but I think we're getting pretty close to being done here.

22 [Recess.]

23 Mr. [REDACTED]. We're back on the record at 11:54.

24 BY MR. [REDACTED]:

25 Q I wanted to ask you a little bit more about your perception of the Capitol

1 Police's preparedness for that day.

2 And so if we could kind of start at the beginning of the day, when you first arrived.
3 Just kind of give me your impressions of how they were organized and their level of
4 preparedness.

5 A We've always experienced a great working relationship and partnership and
6 collaboration with the United States Capitol Police.

7 On January 6th specifically, upon my arrival, I noted that there was very few
8 uniforms of the United States Capitol Police visible on the grass area, the west front, or
9 around the two circles, Peace and Grant Circle.

10 I noticed the officers that I encountered on my walk up toward the west front
11 seemed to be very hectic and scattered, with no clear direction. They weren't running
12 toward the problem, and it almost seemed like they didn't really have an assignment at
13 that point.

14 And when I did get onto the west front plaza, the officers that were there were
15 fighting for every inch on the line.

16 The pepper ball team that I saw above me seemed paralyzed. They weren't
17 being given good direction. They had the capability, but they weren't using it.

18 I saw the deputy chief out there, but didn't see a whole lot of command and
19 control.

20 And, making those observations, I had to make some quick decisions about what
21 we were going to do and just kind of figure out, this is where we're going to start. We
22 always need a starting point.

23 There was one particular sergeant who distinguished himself -- I wish I knew his
24 name -- who did stay with me for quite a period of time. But he, too, was doing what he
25 could. But the decision to pull back into the building was done in a blind and without

1 consultation or understanding of the impact. There was no discussion about why they
2 were pulling back in.

3 You know, all I had been told, to come up to help. And it kind of became the
4 MPD direction at that point. You know, maybe with some further discussion, maybe it
5 would've been better to fight inside. I don't know, because we never had that
6 discussion. I just had to play off what I could physically see without being told.

7 Q Did you have a point of contact throughout the day, as far as somebody who
8 had, kind of, command-level authority at Capitol Police?

9 A The contact that I had with Capitol Police that day was Chief Sund at the
10 time. I exchanged some photographs with him via text of the crowd early over on
11 Constitution Avenue and Washington Monument grounds when I first got there. And
12 that was just general conversations, like, "Hey, Chief, this is what we're working with. I
13 think the crowd's going to be much larger."

14 And then I didn't have any contact with Capitol until getting up on the west front.
15 They had a representative in our Joint Operations Command Center, but I don't know
16 who that representative was. Again, I tend to stay away from command posts. You
17 know, they have people assigned. I try to stay in the field as much as I possibly can.

18 Q And then how about, kind of, on the ground on the west plaza? Was it that
19 unnamed sergeant that was kind of the basically highest-ranking guy that you were able
20 to grab hold of and help you coordinate Capitol's response?

21 A Yes. I did see the deputy chief there. I believe he's now retired. But I
22 couldn't stay with him; he wouldn't stay with me. So the sergeant stayed with me as
23 best as possible until they got the directive to pull back inside.

24 Q Jumping around here a little bit. For the November and December events,
25 can -- and let's focus on November first. Can you explain to me what the response was

1 when you learned that the Presidential motorcade was going to come through and, kind
2 of, how long it took you to organize that response and what changed?

3 A My decision was that we weren't going to support that. However, I was
4 told that we had to give up the minimum amount required by the MOU, the
5 memorandum of understanding, with Secret Service, which would've been a lead tail and
6 three motors.

7 I did direct our members not to use force and let Park UD and the agents
8 themselves handle the motorcade movement coming through the crowd.

9 Uniformed Division did surge out quite a few of their personnel on mountain bikes
10 and on foot as that motorcade proceeded around Freedom Plaza.

11 Q And then for the fly-by in December, was there a required response for that?
12 Or what happened when you learned about that?

13 A We initially were told that he was going to motorcade to the Supreme Court.
14 Secret Service was able to dissuade that from occurring. And then we were notified that
15 the helicopter would be used to fly over the Court on his way out to Andrews Air Force
16 Base.

17 Q And then did you have to -- did MPD have to do anything, kind of, in
18 response to that part?

19 A Not over the flyover, but we had started to shift resources over toward the
20 Supreme Court to supplement both the Supreme Court and the Capitol Police. Because,
21 like I say, initially it was believed he was going to motorcade over, and once he got over
22 there, we would've had to help maintain some type of perimeter and security over there.

23 We were happy to hear that the motorcade was not going to occur. But, again,
24 the flyover was very low and very obtuse and very unusual.

25 Q In -- and I'll ask this question both for November and December. In

1 November, how much of a heads-up did you get, or what was your lead time on needing
2 to pivot?

3 A Maybe 30 minutes. It was very quick. I thought it was a very stupid idea.
4 It put us in a very bad posture. But it was something that, with that particular
5 administration, wasn't the first time we'd been dealt wild cards.

6 Q And then how about in December? I know you said at first you heard it
7 was a motorcade. Did you get a sense for how much lead time you thought you had if
8 the motorcade was going to come through?

9 A I believe we had a little bit more time. Maybe an hour, give or take. And
10 then we got word back about 15 minutes later that it was going to be an HMX lift, or --

11 Q Okay.

12 Mr. [REDACTED] Okay. Then I think, with that, we can put the transcribed interview
13 into recess at 12:02, and -- oh, actually, I'm sorry. Let's go back on the record.

14 Was there anything that you wanted to address, Commander Glover, or any points
15 that we didn't cover today that you think should be covered?

16 Commander Glover. I think, recognizing every member of law enforcement
17 community from whatever agency, from January 6th, performed with distinction,
18 courage, and bravery. And I think the men and women who responded knew the
19 importance of their mission, however small it was.

20 It's hard to understand the number of officers that got hurt that day. This was
21 combat. This is not something that I think any police officer or first responder can
22 understand. This was unparalleled, unprecedented. And it's the first time in my career
23 that I didn't think I was going to go home that night. And it's left a huge impact on a
24 number of our members to this day. I think it's left a huge impact on the Capitol Police.

25 And understanding that this is not a knock against any agency. Every agency had

1 to follow orders, whether you agree with them or not. But those men and women that
2 we helped initially were out there doing what they were supposed to do.

3 I would like to say that, in my professional opinion, when I debriefed the FBI, what
4 I saw and what I observed that day has been proven out through most of the
5 investigation on the criminal side. And when you see gallows sitting on the grounds of
6 the United States Capitol and a guillotine, they wanted to murder somebody that day.
7 Their intent was to hang Mike Pence, hang Speaker Pelosi.

8 And for our country to experience that -- you expect that in an uncivilized,
9 nondemocratic society, but you don't expect that here at the United States. And
10 hopefully we never see it again.

11 And I appreciate the work of the committee. I appreciate everyone's efforts to
12 find the truth. And I appreciate the time.

13 Mr. [REDACTED]. Well, I'll say while we're on the record, as well, that, you know, I
14 think everybody understands the incredible heroism of MPD and all the other agencies
15 that were involved in the response that day. And, you know, for lack of a better way to
16 say it, just thank you for your service and thank you for your efforts on those days and
17 your time today as well. It's very much appreciated.

18 Commander Glover. Thank you.

19 Mr. [REDACTED]. Thanks, Commander Glover.

20 And, with that, we'll go off the record at 12:06.

21 [Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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
Certificate of Deponent/Interviewee

I have read the foregoing ____ pages, which contain the correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded.

Witness Name


Date

The disastercenter.com downloaded the transcripts from the Houses Select Committee's website shortly before the Republican's took control of the House. The DisasterCenter.com is making a low-cost black and white print edition of [The Executive Summary, also called Introductory Materials](#), available on Amazon in paperback and hardcover editions;



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